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Introduction 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower implored American citizens in a 1953 
advertisement to “Wake Up! Sign Up! Look Up!” to Soviet airplanes potentially 
escorting an atomic bomb over the United States.
1
 He encouraged Americans to contact 
their local Civil Defense Director about participating in the Ground Observer Corps, a 
civil defense program established by the United States Air Force (USAF) that involved 
civilian volunteers surveying the skies for enemy aircraft. These volunteers built 
watchtowers in their backyards and community centers, and occupied existing structures 
to survey the skies for Soviet aircraft. They telephoned their local filter centers, staffed by 
Air Force personnel, and if deemed a threat, Air Force staff instructed the Air Defense 
Direction Center (ADDC) to intercept or shoot down the threat.
2
 
This thesis examines the 1950s response to the longstanding problem posed by the 
invention of any new weapon: how to adapt defensive technology to meet the potential 
threat. In the case of the early Cold War period, the GOC was the USAF’s best, albeit 
faulty, defense option against a weapon that did not discriminate between soldiers and 
citizens and rendered traditional ground troops useless. After the Korean War, Air Force 
officials promoted the GOC for its espousal of volunteerism and individualism. 
Encouraged to take ownership of the program, observers appropriated the GOC for their 
personal and community needs, comprised of social gatherings and policing activities, 
thus greatly expanding the USAF’s original objectives. This program, established during 
the tense early Cold War years, continued as the model for air defense. More profoundly, 
study of the GOC reveals ongoing unease about nuclear weapons and frustrations of 
military planners in securing air defense that originated in the early Cold War era. 
2 
GOC Operations and History 
The GOC involved the participation of approximately 350,000 observers, who 
scanned the skies for Soviet aircraft transporting atomic bombs.
3
 Observers reported 
suspected threats to USAF personnel and other civilian volunteers at filter centers. 
According to the Air Force’s official mission statement in its Ground Observer Corps 
Policy Guide, the GOC provided “low altitude visual surveillance” that would “function 
as a supplement to radar in the air defense system.”4 In other words, participants 
facilitated national security by searching for and reporting suspect aircraft to filter centers 
that could evade radar by flying lower than 6,000 feet.
5
 Filter centers then alerted the 
ADDC to direct interceptor jets to shoot down enemy planes.
6
  
Civilian volunteers briefly participated in the GOC in World War II, known then 
as the Aircraft Warning Service (AWS). USAF officials revived the program in 1949 and 
initiated a 24-hour observation program in 1952 known as Operation Skywatch. In a 
notably collaborative effort, participants included youth, prison guards, the elderly, the 
blind, families, and naval and USAF personnel. Observers utilized existing commercial 
structures and built observation towers outfitted with a telephone, binoculars, an 
observation manual, a log of duties and a clock. On January 31, 1959, the Secretary of the 
Air Force announced the termination of the program due to the improvement of detection 
radar and inability of civilians to detect increasingly technical Soviet missile systems.  
 
Civil Defense 
Civil defense of the 1950s, which traditionally refers to bomb shelters and 
evacuation drills, must be clearly defined in the study of the GOC. Laura McEnaney 
conceives of civil defense as “many things at once: a national security agency, a military 
3 
theory about survivability in a nuclear war, and a propaganda effort.”7 Monmouth 
University philosophy professor Guy Oakes describes civil defense simply as the 
“defense of the public by the public.”8 Civil defense served various functions. Some 
scholars theorize that in the atomic age the routinization of civil defense provided 
emotional control and fear management; some argue that it deterred Soviet aggression by 
demonstrating solidarity through preparation; other scholars asserted that civil defense 
informed citizens about the Cold War threat and garnered public buy-in of the war. In 
Chapter One I will explore how a combination of these functions may represent the 
purpose of civil defense conceptualized by the executive branch. 
Prior to 1950, the Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP), an arm of the 
National Security Resources Board, promoted mobilization of the home front.
9
 Because 
the atomic bomb threatened the safety of U.S. citizens equally and subsequently reduced 
the value of ground troops, national security personnel increasingly turned their attention 
to civil defense. McEnaney reiterates this notion, stating that when the Soviets detonated 
an atomic bomb in September 1949, “civil defense planning went from low-key to 
frenetic.”10 The Soviet bomb, fall of China to communism and engagement in the Korean 
War prompted Congress to pass the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.
11
 This act created 
an independent civil defense agency by converting the OCDP to the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration (FCDA), described by Andrew Grossman as a “stand-alone line 
agency of the federal government.”12 The Federal Civil Defense Act established a three-
year defense program, in which the states matched federal funds for shelters and program 
costs, and the federal government supervised warning systems and partially financed the 
cost of training.
13
 As the official civil defense agency, the FCDA served as a “mediating 
4 
institution,” connecting the federal government with research universities, media outlets 
and think tanks.
14
  
The Aircraft Flash, published by the Air Force as the official GOC magazine, 
summarizes three categories of civil defense outlined by the Federal Civil Defense Act: 
1) efforts to minimize the effects of an attack upon the civil population, 2) 
efforts to deal with conditions created by the attack and, 3) efforts to effect 
repairs (emergency) to vital facilities damaged or destroyed. Efforts to 
minimize includes activation of operational plans and supporting 
agreements with community organizations – recruiting, training of 
personnel, procurement and stockpiling of essential supplies. Additional 
measures include warning activities, shelter construction, non-military 
evacuation and establishment of monitory control points. Fire fighting, 
rescue, emergency medical and sanitation, traffic control, etc., are all part 
of the post-attack plan.
15
 
 
While the GOC sought to deter attack, the program also contributed to the 
category outlined in the Act involving “efforts to minimize the effects of an attack upon 
the civil population.”16 One of the GOC's primary missions involved limiting follow-up 
attacks through observation, thereby safeguarding industrial bases that would allow the 
U.S. to retaliate. 
The GOC represented a unique form of civil defense because the Air Force 
established the program to prevent atomic attack, rather than alert citizens to seek shelter 
from an attack or respond to its aftermath. The Aircraft Flash describes the differences in 
purpose, stating “Generally speaking then, GOC is concerned with spotting and stopping 
an enemy attack before it strikes. FCDA is concerned with handling the problems of the 
post-strike period.”17 Although the FCDA did not manage the GOC directly, the 
organization promoted GOC activities and coordinated with state civil defense agencies 
to signal air raid warnings based on ground observer reports.
18
 Additionally, the FCDA 
5 
instructed local civil defense officials, who often worked with the GOC at filter centers 
and observation posts.
19
  
Despite Americans’ fear of Soviet atomic capability, the FCDA experienced 
widespread apathy to civil defense, as FCDA administrator Val Peterson lamented, “The 
greatest problem of my organization is to create a complete understanding of the 
seriousness of the threat . . . and what must be done to meet it.”20 The GOC proved no 
exception, and USAF personnel continuously fought against the perception of civil 
defense as a futile response to the atomic threat and struggled to retain GOC members. 
Observers grew frustrated when they worked for hours without seeing a single aircraft; 
the USAF partially remedied this monotony by initiating mock attacks.  
Ex-GOC members expressed apathetic attitudes to civil defense in an Ad Council 
report concerning membership, citing the following reasons for leaving: “lack of interest, 
no air activity over this area,” “the fact that I was doing a relatively unimportant job and 
that which I did was of no use as far as the defense of our country is concerned,” and “if 
the Air Force needs this service so badly, I think it could allot more of its manpower to 
supervise the recruiting and running of the post.”21 Apathy increased significantly after 
the termination of the Korean War when “the American people perceived less of a threat 
of general war and their patriotic urge to support observation posts subsided.”22 Despite 
this apathy, some citizens considered the GOC worthwhile, an attitude I will examine 
along with the efforts of USAF and the Ad Council to mobilize the public. 
 
Significance 
Examination of the little-studied Ground Observer Corps is significant for four 
principal reasons. First, the GOC represents a unique form of civil defense that diverged 
6 
from other civil defense programs: rather than respond to attacks, the GOC sought to 
prevent them. Second, with the exception of Professor Kenton Clymer, historians of 
national security and civil defense rarely reference the GOC and when they do, they 
simply cite the program as another form of civil defense. These historians have forfeited 
an opportunity to examine in greater detail the effect two major world wars had on the 
national psyche through study of the Ground Observer Corps.  
Third, study of the GOC demonstrates how national security threats mobilize 
citizens, or fail to mobilize them in recent cases, and how this defense preparation 
impacts local communities. Opportunities are ripe for historians to compare why citizens 
of the early Cold War period prepared for an atomic threat with those citizens of the post-
9/11 period, as Americans in the twenty-first century are still coming to terms with broad 
and vague security threats. While local terrorism primarily comprises these threats in the 
twenty-first century, both involve the struggle to identify threats that target civilians 
rather than military officials. As with the GOC, twenty-first century defense planners 
continue to emphasize the role of individuals and communities (as opposed to federal 
officials) in safeguarding their security. Homeland Security’s suggestion to Americans 
“If you see something, say something,” mirrors the FCDA’s “Wake Up! Sign Up! Look 
Up!,” both communicating that national security depends on citizens’ vigilance. 
Lastly, study of the GOC shows how political ideology played an important role 
in mobilizing citizens for civil defense. After passionate deliberation about the size of the 
program and who would have authority over it, congressmen opted for a private shelter 
program in order to save federal money and adhere to democratic principles of 
volunteerism and limited government, creating a “practical and ideological bulwark 
7 
against the garrison state.”23 The resultant privatized program encouraged citizens to take 
civil defense into their own hands, continually adapting it to suit their specific 
communities’ needs, bringing together disparate groups of people for social, charitable, 
policing and observation activities. The Air Force routinely praised these efforts, evident 
in U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg’s evaluation of the program 
as successful primarily because it was conducted democratically.
24
  
 
Methodology and Organization 
The following thesis is comprised of three chapters that analyze the Ground 
Observer Corps between August 1945 — when President Harry S. Truman authorized the 
use of the atomic bomb to end World War II — and 1959, the year that the GOC 
concluded. My study concentrates primarily on observer post volunteers, rather than filter 
center participants or ADDC personnel, allowing me to focus on those members of the 
general public the Air Force specifically sought to educate and recruit. While this thesis 
briefly examines factors contributing to the escalation of Cold War tension, it avoids 
broader study of the causes of the Cold War, on which outstanding scholarship already 
exists. Instead, I examine historical scholarship regarding civil defense and related topics, 
the organization of the GOC, and the implementation of the program at the local level. 
In Chapter One I analyze scholarship of the following topics relevant to the 
Ground Observer Corps: domestic anticommunism, American life and politics in the 
early Cold War period, and atomic age civil defense. The scholarship I study regarding 
life in the post-atomic bomb period begins in the 1980s, when scholars could more 
effectively measure the long-term response of the American public to the use of the 
atomic bomb in World War II. I examine scholarly analysis of the attitudes of the general 
8 
public, social commentators, political figures and atomic scientists following the United 
States’ employment of the nuclear bomb to end World War II. This analysis of civil 
defense scholarship demonstrates how historians in the 1980s reevaluated the subject 
from a social historical perspective and in doing so opened the study to non-white and 
non-urban populations, such as African Americans and farmers.  
In Chapter Two, I explore the organizational history of the GOC including how 
the program operated, as well as the Air Force’s conception of the viability of the 
program. I utilize a case study of the implementation and operation of the GOC in the 
State of Indiana to clarify the confusing relationship between USAF plans and state 
operations. The organizational history allows me to examine communication problems 
between the USAF and state officials that may have further confounded operations. In my 
study of the GOC in Indiana, I utilize the Papers of Governor Henry F. Schricker, 1949-
1953, focusing on the following sources: Indiana Department of Civil Defense notes on 
planning conferences, the state civil defense bulletin The Indiana Civil Defense Sentinel, 
gubernatorial correspondence, newspaper articles, and reports about mock attacks. These 
sources illuminate the daunting process of not only developing, but also implementing a 
method to protect citizens from aerial attack. 
I then compare Indiana's program with the plans and objectives of the Air Force 
by utilizing the Spencer R. Quick Files (Special Assistant to the Assistant to the 
President) at the Harry S. Truman Library and the James M. Lambie Jr. Records (Special 
Assistant in the White House) at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Using this archival 
material, I studied Air Force Public Information Letters, maps and advertisements, 
proceedings of GOC conferences involving state and USAF officials, presidential 
9 
statements, USAF telegrams, the Ground Observer Corps Policy Guide and monthly 
reports about GOC participation by region. The Aircraft Flash is an invaluable source 
that sheds light on the Air Force's conception of the purpose of the GOC. Study of Air 
Force objectives and their implementation at the state level reveals that the GOC initially 
served as the best air defense option available, but not as a highly effective one.  
Following a study of the Air Force’s objectives and the GOC’s organization, I 
examine the actual implementation of the program at the local level in Chapter Three. I 
analyze the ideology behind what Laura McEnaney terms “American-style civil defense,” 
predicated on individualism, volunteerism and capitalism, and how this type of civil 
defense impacted communities through the GOC. By encouraging participants to adapt 
the program to suit local needs, this “American-style civil defense” ushered in the 
participation of disparate groups, such as World War II displaced persons, teenagers and 
monks. These groups interacted not only at observation posts and filter centers, but 
engaged in social, policing, and charitable activities as a result of the program.  
To demonstrate the unique nature of these GOC activities, I utilize Civil Air 
Patrol annual reports to compare the GOC program with the CAP, a similar civil air 
defense program operating under the USAF. In comparison, the GOC was much more 
financially, socially and operationally accessible than the CAP. Because the GOC 
functioned differently depending on the region of operation, I study how the program 
affected communities in agricultural areas predicated on farming; metropolitan areas 
representative of American culture; and regions with observation posts already in 
existence for other purposes, typically along the northern border of the U.S. I primarily 
utilize excerpts from The Aircraft Flash and oral history interviews I conducted with the 
10 
Haan family in Cairo, Indiana to develop a sense of local operations because few 
observer accounts are widely available. I scanned both local and national newspaper 
articles and editorials, The Aircraft Flash and civil defense records of Governor 
Schricker’s Papers and found only a handful of these accounts. More records may exist, 
and should be located by historians, but I confined my research to midwestern records. 
Serendipitously, a colleague and I encountered the Haan family while driving 
through Cairo, Indiana. I stopped to ask about the GOC tower, and they told me how their 
family had helped build, man and commemorate it. Because of their generosity, I was 
able to obtain first-hand accounts of observation activities through oral history 
interviews, as well as several documents showing construction of the tower and efforts, 
spanning decades, to commemorate it. Had it not been for the Haans’ willingness to share 
their memories I would have had to rely solely on scant newspaper articles and The 
Aircraft Flash to gain a sense of participating in the atomic age program.  
To study how the program impacted non-agricultural communities, I studied The 
Aircraft Flash’s articles, editorials and “Flashes” section. Throughout my research I 
sought sources that would represent an array of participants, including program 
organizers, Air Force officials, and volunteers, including those who left the program. 
Through study of the GOC, I discovered that the Air Force considered the GOC 
the best, although an ineffective, defense tool. In the post-Korean War period officials 
began to recognize the potential of the GOC to promote the principles of volunteerism 
and individualism. The GOC illustrates the importance of this civil defense ideology, as 
observers funded their own projects and organized their own posts. Because the USAF 
and FCDA encouraged volunteers to take ownership of the program, observers 
11 
appropriated the program to suit their individual and community’s needs. This adaptation 
greatly expanded the USAF’s original conception of the program from one of solely 
defensive value to one that benefited community welfare and improved “spiritual unity” 
through social, charitable and community policing activities.
25
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Chapter 1: A Study of Scholarship Regarding the Atomic Age 
An examination of historical scholarship regarding communism in the U.S. during 
the 1950s helps explain the link between ideology and American civil defense. Because 
victims of the anticommunist movement finally felt comfortable discussing their 
experiences, scholars in the 1970s increasingly criticized their persecutors. After the Cold 
War and with access to new Soviet sources, in the 1990s historians provided more 
nuanced accounts of domestic anticommunism and went beyond criticizing Senator 
Joseph McCarthy to analyzing the suspicious actions of American communists.
26
 Post-
9/11 examination of early Cold War anticommunism is generally more critical of the 
perpetrators for witch-hunting following a national security crisis. 
 David Caute’s 1978 The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman 
and Eisenhower is one of the first works of scholarship to examine the victims of the 
communist witch hunts, rather than their pursuers.
27
 Caute states that when he began 
research in the early 1970s the “ice cap which still froze the victims into postures of 
silence in the middle sixties had now lifted.”28 Contemporary historians consider his 
argument general knowledge, that the communist “purges” extensively affected victims, 
primarily through job loss and damaged reputations. However, The Great Fear was 
notable when published, as it served as one of the first scholarly works to publicize 
victims’ experiences through oral history interviews, including an interview with Alger 
Hiss.
29
 This opportunity may explain Caute’s impassioned preface, in which he is deeply 
critical of the United States in the early Cold War era, stating that by 1945 “America’s 
patriotic imperative had acquired a truly imperialistic and even messianic image of its 
own mission in the world.”30  
13 
Caute elucidates why and when the communist “purge,” generally the expulsion 
of teachers, military personnel and Hollywood actors from their jobs, materialized and 
dissipated. While Caute provides an extraordinary sampling of cases of political 
persecution, his work generally lacks a thesis. He does, however, contend that “These 
bureaucratic attempts to deprive radicals of the financial and welfare benefits to which all 
eligible citizens were entitled must rank among the meanest harassments of the purge.”31 
Nevertheless, Caute’s examination of the impact of the communist “purge,” especially 
regarding labor, is foundational to later research. 
Richard M. Fried explores how “populist anti-communism” operated and 
impacted Americans in the early Cold War period in his 1998 The Russians are Coming! 
The Russians are Coming!: Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America.
32
 Rather 
than focus on how political elites like Senator McCarthy incited Americans to rally 
against communism, Fried studies how “Americans sought to nerve fellow-citizens for 
the long struggle against communism abroad and at home.”33 Fried theorizes that Cold 
War activists tried to replicate the patriotism and pageantry that mobilized citizens on the 
home front during World War II in order to meet the Cold War domestic communist 
threat. He states that the mobilization of patriotism in World War II had an enduring 
effect, that the “patriotic practices now second nature to us,” such as playing “The Star-
Spangled Banner” at public events, did not grow up “with the Republic, but they are of 
more recent vintage.”34  
Cold War patriots argued that softness on communism represented national 
disunity and that engaging in local patriotic activities like flag pageants “bespoke a 
concern over communism on one hand and, on the other, the broader malady of flaccid 
14 
citizenship.”35 Fried concludes that while these local crusaders sought to relive the unity 
of World War II through pageantry, many Americans proved uninterested, citing an 
elementary school principal’s astonishment that only three students out of hundreds 
actually knew the national anthem. Fried concedes that only an illusion of mass 
patriotism existed in the 1950s, thereby greatly diminishing the degree of hysteria 
regarding the communist threat and the strength of Caute’s analysis. 
Ellen Schrecker researched and penned her 1998 Many Are the Crimes: 
McCarthyism in America to discover why her sixth-grade chemistry teacher lost his job.
36
 
She explores the nuances of the evolution and operation of the anticommunist crusade in 
the 1940s and 1950s, investigating those citizens on the fringes of the anticommunism 
movement rather than focusing solely on McCarthy. She concludes that the 
anticommunist movement depended on a “collaborative effort,” comprised of a 
longstanding network of anticommunists that included labor leaders, bureaucrats, ex-
communists, journalists and priests who had been working for decades to eradicate 
communism.
37
 Schrecker ascribes some blame to American communists for their 
persecution, describing how the secrecy of their operations and the violence between 
factions within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) made them a target of the 
anticommunist movement. According to her, the American Communist Party provided 
just enough examples of communist sabotage to legitimize a threat, but by no means to 
the degree feared by anticommunists, and that communist victims “certainly were not 
misidentified,” regardless of whether they should have been persecuted.38 
Perhaps most illuminating is her description of “anticommunist professionals,” 
those citizens who took it upon themselves to investigate potential domestic communists. 
15 
Schrecker utilizes the correspondence and papers of these professionals to examine their 
methods, citing Walter Steele, a “professional patriot” who amassed and catalogued the 
names of 40,000 suspected communists and published his own anticommunist 
newsletter.
39
 She asserts that although there were only a few hundred of these citizen 
crusaders, their former ties to communism qualified them as experts, who were of 
considerable value to politicians who knew little about the Communist Party. Schrecker 
dismisses the notion that anticommunism gained footing because citizens in the 1950s 
were more apt to accept it based on hysteria induced by Cold War threats. Instead, she 
argues that collaborations between citizens, church officials, the FBI and politicians 
fueled the movement and that “it was the very diversity of the anticommunist network 
that made it so powerful” and caused “Americans at every level of society” to believe 
“that Communism endangered the nation.”40 Schrecker states that as a result of this 
collaborative effort, and because the crusade touched nearly everyone, she utilized the 
widest variety of sources possible, including FBI files and communist memoirs, rather 
than gathered sources in depth for only one or two cases. 
Elaine Tyler May's 2011 “Security against Democracy: The Legacy of the Cold 
War at Home” studies how the postwar fear of communism resulted in the structuring of 
security, both personal and national, around the capitalist system, an analysis especially 
relevant to the GOC.
41
 May theorizes that in order to withstand the "harsh postwar 
climate and protect the American way of life" Americans relied on a "belief in individual 
freedom, unfettered capitalism, the sanctity of the home, and a suspicion of others."
42
 She 
theorizes that this individualism is evident in both the privatized national shelter system 
and citizens’ increasing tendency to arm themselves. May asserts that the media 
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convinced citizens to meet the threat individually, to the detriment of “democratic 
practices” and “public good.” She cites advertisements from the 1950s that projected this 
rhetoric, such as an insurance company that targeted the “‘do-it-yourself American,’” 
who “‘is creating his own security.’”43 She aptly references a 1953 speech of Elizabeth 
Gordon, editor-in-chief of House Beautiful, that emphasizes individualism and free 
enterprise and decries international style for its potential to encourage “‘collectivism and 
totalitarian control.’”44 More so than her predecessors, May analyzes the long-term effect 
of militarizing society through the emphasis of individual security in the early Cold War 
period, stating that modern America is more armed, but no safer. She cites reports about 
firearm ownership and perceived fear of crime.  
Scholarship regarding atomic age politics and culture emerged primarily in the 
late 1980s and 1990s as the Cold War came to a close and scholars could more 
effectively measure the long-term response of the American public to the use of the 
atomic bomb in World War II. Some researchers attribute changes in early Cold War 
politics and culture to the responses of U.S. policy planners and politicians to the atomic 
and communist threat, while others correlate changes directly to the World War II use of 
the atomic bomb. Those scholars who attribute changes directly to the use of the bomb 
dispute the period in which the atomic bomb most impacted American life, the degree to 
which the bomb influenced it, and the aspects of American life the bomb affected, but all 
concur that the atomic bomb profoundly altered American life. Most scholars studying 
early Cold War politics and culture mention the existence of dualities in the period: 
consumerism and militarism, widespread dissent and consensus regarding U.S. reaction 
to international threats, and “soft” and “hard” responses to domestic communism. 
17 
In 1985 Paul Boyer published By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and 
Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age based on his recollection of growing up in the 
atomic era, as well as the heated 1980s debates about nuclear power.
45
 Boyer was among 
the first historians to analyze how the use of the bomb influenced American culture and 
public perception regarding atomic energy. He focuses on the period between August 
1945 and 1950 and concludes that while the dropping of the atomic bomb in World War 
II profoundly affected Americans (more than Lincoln’s assassination), attitudes and 
societal changes varied. Boyer examines the Gallup poll and a 1946 report of the Social 
Science Research Council to illustrate that American attitudes regarding the atomic bomb 
varied with the period. He argues that while Americans may have felt anxiety one month, 
and optimism and apathy in the next few months, these results did not conflict, but 
represented continuously shifting attitudes. Boyer admits that surveys can fall short of 
representing the variety of attitudes that simultaneously existed during the period, but he 
contends that by 1950 widespread realization about potential destruction by the atomic 
bomb caused citizens to view defense as futile, resulting in mass public complacency.  
Elaine Tyler May also studies the impact of the atomic age on American culture, 
but confines her analysis to families and married couples.
46
 May argues in her 1988 
Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era that Cold War ideology and 
domestic life similarly centered around the notion of security through containment. In the 
uncertain post-World War II atmosphere, families reverted to the home to seek shelter 
from and “contain” the threat of atomic war, social deviants, and uncertainty about the 
postwar economy. In order to understand the correlation between the atomic age and 
notions of domesticity, May studies popular culture through movies, periodicals and 
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newspapers, statements of public policy makers, and the Kelly Longitudinal Studies 
(KLS). May most heavily utilizes the KLS to determine why “white middle-class 
Americans adhered so strongly to a normative and quite specifically defined notion of 
family life at the time.”47 She determines that these Americans “wanted secure jobs, 
secure homes, and secure marriages in a secure country. Security would enable them to 
take advantage of the fruits of prosperity and peace that were, at long last, available.”48 
May maintains that in an age where uncertainty reigned, intimate family structures 
provided “the best bulwark against the dangers of the cold war,” as well as reassurance 
that the human race could endure despite atomic threats.
49
  
Geoffrey Smith studies how high-ranking government officials in the early Cold 
War period influenced societal practices in an effort to bolster national security.
50
 In his 
1992 “National Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender and Disease in the Cold-
War United States,” Smith proposes to “make explicit the sexual subtext underlying 
attitudes toward national security, to the perceived Soviet menace, and the need to 
preserve and project US power generally.”51 He contends that in the tense post-World 
War II environment, the national security state — comprised of scientists, civilian 
bureaucrats, the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency and even clergy 
members— influenced public life by emphasizing that national security hinged on the 
espousal of traditional gender and familial roles. Smith argues further that the individuals 
and organizations comprising the national security state successfully convinced 
Americans that dissident groups such as homosexuals, much like Soviets and 
communists, could threaten the nation’s safety by being more naturally susceptible to 
communism.   
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The equation of social deviance with disease resulted in the suppression of 
individuals' sexuality. Smith utilizes sources such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 
Executive Order 10450, which banned homosexuals from federal employment, and the 
Senate's Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government to illustrate 
how some facets of the national security state reinforced traditional gender roles through 
the public chastisement and exclusion of the socially and sexually deviant. He then 
examines popular literature, including tabloids, a New Yorker cartoon, and Newsweek 
articles, to demonstrate how widely accepted the fear of the “gay threat” had become in 
Cold War America. Smith and May agree that Americans assumed traditional gender 
roles in the early Cold War period, but Smith postulates that this adherence resulted from 
the pressure of government officials seeking to safeguard national security, while May 
suggests that Americans voluntarily maintained these roles because of atomic age 
anxiety. 
Allan M. Winkler studies how scientists, social commentators and government 
officials worked in “a series of intersecting circles” to influence the public’s response to 
the existence of the atomic bomb.
52
 In his 1993 Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety 
About the Atom Winkler examines how reaction to atomic energy in the early Cold War 
period influenced modern attitudes about nuclear weapons. Winkler's work shares 
similarities with Boyer's examination of attitudes regarding the existence of atomic 
energy, but Winkler focuses less on public reaction and more on competing attempts of 
scientists, government officials and commentators to influence public perception. He 
observes the popularity of John Hershey’s Hiroshima to argue that social commentators 
first roused public concern about the destructive potential of the atomic bomb. He then 
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cites the unanticipated success of the Federation of Atomic Scientists’ best-selling One 
World or None to illustrate that atomic scientists initially attracted public support for 
international control of nuclear weapons. Winkler concludes that ultimately “government 
officials rather than scientists or cultural critics seized the initiative in shaping the public 
agenda” and that the failure to embrace more creative solutions regarding the possession 
of atomic power explains why “deep-rooted and corrosive fears of nuclear destruction 
have failed in the past fifty years to bring atomic weaponry under effective control.”53  
Tom Engelhardt claims in his 1995 The End of Victory Culture: Cold War 
America and the Disillusioning of a Generation that the “American war story,” based on 
a history of total and just victory, vanished with the dropping of the atomic bomb at the 
conclusion of World War II.
54
 He argues that horror quickly replaced celebration among 
the American public and that a duality between comforting consumerism and the national 
security state emerged in American society as a result of the use of the atomic bomb. 
Engelhardt recalls as a young boy sketching on the pages of his history textbook 
mushroom clouds over a map of U.S. missile supplies in the mid-Pacific. As a starting 
point he examines his own experiences growing up in the early Cold War to demonstrate 
that how Americans came “to terms with the slow-motion collapse of a heroic war ethos 
thereafter, are central themes underlying American popular culture from 1945 on.”55 
Engelhardt claims that the United States lost its national identity at the end of World War 
II with newfound atomic power and the absence of an identifiable enemy. He believes 
that this loss of identity led to the end of the victory narrative before the 1960s. He 
analyzes popular culture, such as early Cold War comic books and films, to demonstrate 
that Americans struggled with this uncertainty. He points to Life's 1947 “How to Spot a 
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Communist,” comics like “By the Fright of the Silvery Moon,” and movies such as the 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers to illustrate that Americans developed a sense of 
insecurity based on suspicion of the existence of a foreign threat at home. Engelhardt 
argues that these sources represent the broader ongoing Cold War struggle to identify and 
adequately counteract foreign threats, a process contrary to the “American war story” of 
total and righteous victory. 
With her 1997 Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age 
Margot A. Henriksen, purports to be one of the first historians to link the development of 
the atomic bomb with revolutionary cultural change occurring prior to the 1980s. 
Henriksen primarily studies film noir, along with popular magazines of the late 1940s and 
1950s, to demonstrate that the use of the bomb in World War II revolutionized 
“American values and expectations” as represented by cultural products. Henriksen posits 
that Boyer is mistaken in his assertion that American culture changed only sporadically in 
the years following the use of the atomic bomb and that by 1950 Americans demonstrated 
complacency regarding the atomic threat. She counters that technological change, 
primarily the development of nuclear weapons, directly inspired cultural change reflected 
in dark literature and movies and eventually the cultural dissent of the 1960s. According 
to Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the 
Bomb, along with films such as Sunset Boulevard and White Heat, embody the cultural 
dissent of a generation disillusioned with the extreme violence of World War II and the 
unprecedented U.S. power accumulated in the post-World War period. Henriksen 
concludes by noting a dual existence of popular consensus and dissent regarding U.S. 
action in the Cold War period. 
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Lisle A. Rose contends in his 1999 The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America 
in 1950 that the Cold War “came home” to Americans between the end of 1949 and the 
beginning of 1950.
56
 Rose argues that despite the use of the atomic bomb in 1945, 
American attitudes “came home,” or largely shifted from “cautious optimism” about their 
future to suspicion and concern regarding the Soviet atomic threat in early 1950. Rose’s 
argument counteracts Boyer’s contention that by 1950 American hysteria about the bomb 
had dwindled, as Rose states that “when one compares what the national press was saying 
and reporting during Christmas week 1949 with what it said and reported a year later, it is 
clear that the enormous change in the American temperament, generally assumed to have 
taken place at the outset of the cold war in 1946-1947, actually occurred several years 
later.”57 
Rose represents the opinions of average Americans, rather than the politicians 
analyzed by Smith or the atomic scientists and policy-makers studied by Winkler. 
Additionally, Rose more carefully emphasizes than his predecessors that this change 
occurred as the result of three factors: the 1949 explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb, 
McCarthy’s persecution of State Department employees, and the outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950. Rose demonstrates this shift in attitudes by citing man-on-the-street 
interviews, Gallup Polls and articles published in The Economist and The New York 
Times to show that Americans were not generally concerned about American security 
even in mid-1949. He compares these records with interviews, polls and editorials taken 
between late-1949 and 1953 to successfully demonstrate that “division and distrust 
replaced the sense . . . of shared values and purpose that had defined the nation since 
Franklin Roosevelt’s time.”58  
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K.A. Cuordileone studied historian and cultural critic Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.’s 
1949 The Vital Center to analyze the “nexus between cultural and political life in the 
1940s and 1950s.”59 In her 2000 “‘Politics in an Age of Anxiety’: Cold War Political 
Culture and the Crisis in American Masculinity, 1949-1960” Cuordileone concludes, 
through Schlesinger’s writings, that American politicians in the early Cold War 
internalized the lesson learned in World War II, made especially relevant in the volatile 
atomic age, that personal weakness and indecisiveness (e.g., “softness”) made one 
susceptible to totalitarianism or communism. She argues that this “dualism,” soft versus 
hard, “imprisoned the discourse of the era” and resulted in competition to assert one’s 
masculinity, the suppression of non-normative sexuality and reaffirmation of the 
traditional patriarchal family structure. In addition to examining The Vital Center, 
Cuordileone studies popular literature of the 1950s to demonstrate how male characters’ 
quest to prove their manhood and strengthen their sense of self illustrated an effort to 
ease anxiety in the atomic age through the assumption of traditional male identities. Like 
May and Smith, Cuordileone explores the early Cold War reversion to traditional gender 
roles, but Cuordileone focuses on politicians’ concern with their own behaviors, rather 
than the public’s concern, and how this self-regulation allowed politicians to maintain 
their careers during the Cold War. 
Scholarship regarding the effect of the atomic bomb on American life 
demonstrates how the political and domestic realms intertwined as a result of the nuclear 
bomb, as policy-makers attempted to safeguard national security by influencing societal 
behavior. Scholarship beginning in the mid-1980s, broadly examines how the atomic 
bomb and the communist threat influenced the American public as a whole, but in later 
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years, studies focused more narrowly on families and dissenting groups like 
homosexuals. The majority of studies conclude that the atomic bomb fundamentally 
altered American life and politics, but researchers continue to dispute the duration and 
intensity of the bomb’s impact. 
Civil defense scholarship prior to the 1980s evaluated the costs of shelters, 
medical effects of radiation on the population and technical aspects of defense, while 
generally neglecting nuanced analysis of political and cultural factors impacting the 
design and implementation of civil defense. In the 1969 Survival and the Bomb: Methods 
of Civil Defense, editor and former member of the General Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Eugene P. Wigner compiled a series of essays that he 
hoped would reverse the publication trend of erroneous books of “artistic value,” those 
that attempted to sway readers about the value of civil defense, and those that described 
only the rudimentary facts about civil defense.  
However, in the 1980s scholars reevaluated civil defense from a social historical 
perspective, primarily examining cultural factors, rather than the strategic or economic 
ones that traditional historians emphasized. In the post-Cold War period, scholars merged 
cultural and political studies and favored the interpretation of the militarization of the 
home front as the result of civil defense. Few published works analyze the GOC as a 
form of civil defense, but much of the scholarly analysis is applicable to the program. 
JoAnne Brown argues in her 1988 “‘A is for Atom, B is for Bomb’: Civil Defense 
in American Public Education, 1948-1963,” that “civil defense became a way of life in 
American schools, not by the concerted efforts of federal agents, but in piecemeal 
fashion, as each group incorporated the new demands of the atomic age into its traditional 
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preoccupations.”60 Brown examines professional education journals from the 1950s to 
demonstrate that school administrators viewed civil defense as an opportunity to teach 
children the value of stoicism and resolve in the atomic age, which would counteract the 
panic that made the bomb a threat. Through routinizing drills, establishing bomb shelters 
as reading areas and turning civil defense into a game, school systems domesticated the 
bomb and the fear that accompanied it. Brown studies Journal of Education articles such 
as the 1954 “Prevention of Panic in Elementary School Children” and those published by 
the Journal of the National Education Association to illustrate that school officials 
believed the ritual of civil defense could keep communities safe, going so far as to equate 
a dog tag with a “talisman.”  
Philosophy professor at Monmouth University Guy Oakes with his 1994 The 
Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture approaches civil defense 
from a philosophical perspective and argues that citizens found civil defense therapeutic 
because by routinizing and repeating preparation activities, like those prescribed in the 
Federal Civil Defense Administration's 1953 Home Protection Exercises, Americans 
could take safety into their own hands.
61
 Like Brown, Oakes asserts that the objective of 
civil defense extended beyond the mere physical protection of citizens to the moral health 
of the community. However, Oakes expounds upon Brown’s argument, asserting that not 
only did FCDA officials hope to manage fear through civil defense, but these officials 
also hoped to utilize civil defense as a form of propaganda that would gain public support 
of the deterrence policy.  
Oakes states that these officials, working with the White House, reasoned that the 
“construction of an ethic that interpreted civil defense as a moral obligation of every 
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household . . . would produce the ultimate moral foundation of national security through 
nuclear deterrence.”62 Planners assigned gendered civil defense activities to the public to 
manage emotions and preempt defeatist attitudes regarding the Soviet Union's atomic 
arms. Oakes examines the personal papers and speeches of FCDA spokesperson 
Katherine Howard and National Security Resources Board (NSRB) memorandums to 
show how the gendered “care-taking” skills of women afforded them new professional 
activities through civil defense. Using FCDA records and those of the Truman Library, 
Oakes moves from the narrative of citizens as participants in civil defense to one of 
militarization of the home front, contending that “civil defense militarizes life by 
nonmilitary means, using techniques of emotion management in order to train Americans 
to manage themselves.”63  
Susan Stoudinger Northcutt, professor of government and international affairs at 
the University of South Florida, refers to and agrees with Oakes that women became 
integral to the 1950s civil defense effort.
64
 In her 1999 “Women and the Bomb: 
Domestication of the Atomic Bomb in the United States” Stoudinger Northcutt evaluates 
the role of women in civil defense more extensively than Oakes, bemoaning the fact that 
scholarship largely neglects female discourse about nuclear weapons. She deliberately 
researches the involvement of women according to feminist inquiry. Stoudinger 
Northcutt contends that “during the 1950s and early 1960s the atomic bomb was largely 
feminized and domesticated by means of a government-sponsored program called 'civil 
defense.'”65 She uses qualitative analysis to demonstrate how civil defense agencies like 
the FCDA, in addition to cultural institutions, promoted preparedness of the home with 
her comparison of the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) pamphlet Personal Preparedness 
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in the Nuclear Age, and a Life article, both published in 1961. She notes differences in 
semantics, photographs and font, but contends that both produced a message that by the 
early 1960s “women constituted an import segment of the audience, fulfilling 
requirements and responsibilities of domestic and national security.”66 Stoudinger 
Northcutt places women at the center of the narrative of the militarization of the home 
front, contending that civil defense transferred “military power to the domestic world,” 
over which women presided.
67
  
In her 2000 Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in 
the Fifties Laura McEnaney focuses primarily on the political, rather than the cultural 
context of civil defense. McEnaney borrows from her predecessors, stating that her work 
“builds upon those who have already provided models of how to blend political and 
diplomatic and social and cultural history.”68 She contends that the lack of consensus of 
national politicians resulted in the privatization of civil defense, which required drilling 
activities leading to the militarization of the home front.  
Although McEnaney agrees with Oakes and Stoundinger Northcutt that privatized 
civil defense activities militarized the home front, she argues further that these activities 
resulted in civilians’ adoption of military perspectives still held in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. McEnaney agrees with Oakes that civil defense afforded women 
new professional opportunities, but through examination of 1950s speeches of the 
General Federation of Women’s Clubs she contends that their participation hinged on 
these opportunities. McEnaney broadens scholarship of African Americans’ role in civil 
defense, using FCDA reports about Operation Scat to analyze how the FCDA tried to 
harness their support for civil defense. She also analyzes how these groups used civil 
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defense opportunities to promote civil rights and social agendas by looking at letters of 
the NAACP protesting Millard F. Caldwell's appointment as the director of the FCDA 
because of his racist statements.  
Albion College political science professor Andrew D. Grossman in his 2001 
Neither Dead nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development during the 
Early Cold War examines the “social and political mechanisms” used by the federal 
government and the FCDA to mobilize civil defense, arguing that civil defense provided 
the social control necessary to maintain Truman’s national security objectives. 
Specifically, Grossman studies the participation of research universities, think tanks and 
major media organizations like the Ad Council in their promotion of federal defense 
objectives to show how long-term mobilization institutionalized Cold War policy and 
militarized civilian life. He concludes that the grassroots marketing approach to selling 
civil defense successfully motivated white suburbia (the FCDA could not keep up with 
local demand for programs), but in the process “mobilization conflated almost all 
domestic policy with overall national security policy, often limiting an expansive 
liberalism in favor of the more restrictive segregationist liberalism.”69  
Grossman furthers the study of African Americans’ involvement in civil defense, 
but focuses less on how African Americans utilized participation to negotiate civil rights. 
He instead concentrates on the Truman administration’s espousal of both political 
liberalism and segregation in civil defense and how this paradox influenced Congress and 
the FCDA to plan for evacuation and the post-atomic social structure along racial and 
sectional lines. He analyzes statistics, graphs and comparative charts to demonstrate that 
through research studies and grassroots marketing, governmental agencies like the FCDA 
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successfully mobilized white suburban communities. He compares the 1951 Preliminary 
Report on Public Attitudes towards Civil Defense, compiled by the Survey Research 
Center of the University of Michigan, with the FCDA's 1952 Annual Report, Community 
Mobilization, State of New Jersey, to show that research-related marketing campaigns can 
be linked to increased civil defense participation. Grossman’s analysis of the role women 
played in civil defense contradicts many of his colleagues’, as he refutes the notion that 
civil defense reinforced conventional gender roles, arguing instead that programs like the 
GOC and the FCDA's employment of women as firefighters challenged traditional gender 
roles.  
In her 2006 analysis of 1950s civil defense, Jenny Barker-Devine focuses 
specifically on rural and farming communities in “‘Mightier than Missiles’: The Rhetoric 
of Civil Defense for Rural Families, 1950-1970.”70 Through the study of FCDA and 
USDA campaign material, she concludes that “agriculture occupied a unique place in the 
rhetoric of civil defense whereby farmers not only provided material sustenance, but also 
a moral foundation for the entire country.”71 Like Grossman, she examines how Alert 
America and mass educational campaigns mobilized citizens, but does not believe that 
participation hinged on marketing. Using the Colorado Douglas County News, Barker-
Devine demonstrates that rural citizens inquired about ways to participate by requesting 
Office of Civil Defense Mobilization (OCDM) publications. She cites a 1954 Wallace’s 
Farmer poll to contend that “rural residents were curious about communism and nuclear 
war and that curiosity contributed to the rise of civil defense programs.”72  
Although Barker-Devine demonstrates that the federal government and affiliated 
civil defense agencies considered the participation of rural and farm populations in civil 
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defense activities essential to maintaining national morale during the early Cold War 
period, she concludes with a caveat, stating “historians need to consider, however, 
whether the rhetoric of rural civil defense actually matched the actions of agricultural 
leaders, farmers, and rural communities.”73 She summarizes the article by describing 
Douglas County, Colorado civil defense director Morris Fleming’s doubt about whether 
or not he actually had any impact in rallying citizens to participate in defense. 
David Krugler concentrates on the development of Cold War civil defense plans 
by the national government and military, rather than the implementation of the plans in 
state and local areas.
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 In his 2006 This is Only a Test: How Washington, D.C., Prepared 
for Nuclear War, Krugler examines the development of civil defense in Washington 
because it “was the national security state’s nerve center.”75 Whereas Grossman posits 
that FCDA marketing worked too well, inspiring massive participation in local areas that 
could not be facilitated efficiently by the agency, Krugler argues that the root problem in 
executing civil defense stemmed from external factors that stymied FCDA planning and 
resulted in widespread public apathy to civil defense. He contends that Americans never 
wholeheartedly adopted civil defense because Washington officials could not agree on 
the most effective form of it and because “rapidly evolving weapons and delivery 
methods continually confounded Washington’s civil defense, dispersal, and continuity of 
government planners.”76  
Krugler asserts that this indecision and inconsistency led to public apathy towards 
civil defense, stating that local planners mused “How could Washington or any other city 
write a plan for defense against ICBMs when the FCDA wouldn’t share its own data.”77 
Krugler analyzes how planning inefficiencies adversely affected civil defense 
31 
participation by comparing the Civil Defense for National Survival Hearings before the 
House Military Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations 
with the Washington Daily News’ “We’re Sitting Ducks,” which exhibited public apathy 
to defense plans. 
Andrew Falk's 2010 analysis of civil defense radically departs from former 
interpretations. In “‘Atomic Babble’: Civil Defense and Citizen Opportunities, 1945-
1964,” he contends that citizens not only did not participate in civil defense, but that they 
dissented against civil defense messages.
78
 Falk explores how the media and the “new 
medium” of television simultaneously disseminated the FCDA's message and provided a 
platform for dissenters to express their disapproval of civil defense messages. He 
therefore studies popular media sources to examine the failed attempt of the FCDA and 
the OCD to “preach the virtue of self-help” and the resistance of celebrities and “opinion-
makers” to these messages.79 Falk cites a 1958 film that claimed Portland citizens would 
be hailed as martyrs for defending an electric power grid through atomic bombing and 
then examines backlash against these messages by examining the Hollywood Democratic 
Committee Papers, in which actors and actresses utilized their status as public figures to 
spread dissent. He concludes his comparison of media-related sources by stating that “the 
one consistent characteristic of American civil defense policy was its confusion and 
inconsistency.”80  
Scholarship beginning in the 1980s reevaluated civil defense from a social 
historical perspective and in doing so opened the study to rural and non-white 
populations, such as farmers and African Americans. As scholarship proceeded into the 
post-Cold War period, scholars merged cultural and political studies and favored the 
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interpretation of the militarization of the home front as the result of civil defense. In 
addition to analyzing the militarization of the home front, recent scholarship explores 
dissent against civil defense, a subject likely to generate additional analysis. 
More specifically, Cold War scholarship is important to the study of the GOC 
because it establishes the social and political context that enabled Congress to develop 
and the USAF to encourage a privatized civil defense program. This scholarship also 
represents the diversity of opinions regarding fear of the atomic threat, including notable 
apathy, and denotes the organizational and morale problems that stymied civil defense. 
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Chapter 2: The Ground Observer Corps, 1949-1959: 
“Radar’s Fast-Growing Little Brother” 
 
 
 
 
This 1953 Ad Council advertisement iterated the need for the 
Ground Observer Corps, as Soviet aircraft could evade faulty radar and 
penetrate the United States by flying at low altitudes. Air Force personnel 
sought to fortify the fence with vigilant GOC observers. 
 
How does a nation mend a “10 mile high fence full of holes?” United States Air 
Force (USAF) personnel, with the support of federal officials, attempted in 1950 to 
answer this question by resurrecting the GOC, a program intended to aid in the detection 
of Soviet enemy aircraft. Civilian volunteers across the nation constructed observation 
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towers and reported to USAF staff and civilian volunteers at filter centers via telephones 
if they suspected a threat. This chapter seeks to answer the following questions about the 
GOC: What was the official purpose of the program? Did the USAF believe that the 
GOC could actually supplement and strengthen U.S. air defense? How did the Air Force 
interact with state governments to initiate and organize the program? This study uses the 
Indiana experience as a case study to examine the GOC from the perspectives of USAF 
personnel and elected and civil defense officials at the federal and state levels. 
This analysis found that from 1949 to approximately l954 USAF planners sought 
to strengthen air defense with the GOC because of limited defense options, but were 
realistic about the program’s general inability to neutralize the majority of air threats or to 
strengthen U.S. defense. In the years following the termination of the Korean War in 
1953, planners increasingly viewed the program as a tool to further the principles of 
preparation and volunteerism and to regenerate support for Cold War objectives that had 
waned with the end of the war in Korea.  
American attitudes regarding the Soviet Union shifted drastically with the defeat 
of Hitler at the end of World War II. During the war, Americans emphasized similarities 
between themselves and the Soviets throughout their collaborative efforts, but upon the 
war’s conclusion, they increasingly compared Soviet ideology to that of Nazi Germany, 
branding Soviet totalitarianism “Red Fascism.”81 Soviet “imperialistic behavior” 
resulting in hegemony over Eastern Europe and the totalitarian prohibition of freedom of 
expression combined to form an ominous and familiar threat in the minds of Americans.
82
 
Despite this perceived threat, even in 1949 Americans retained a sense of security based 
on the United States’ atomic monopoly and scientists’ estimation that the Soviets would 
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not develop a nuclear bomb until 1952.
83
 However, in 1949 national defense analyst S. 
Arthur Devan described how the Soviets promptly upset this sense of security. In an 
article for the Library of Congress he stated, “Just as this paper was in the final stages of 
drafting, President Truman announced suddenly (September 23, 1949) that our 
Government had evidence that ‘within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the 
U.S.S.R.’”84  
It was not until November 1949 that American citizens realized the gravity of the 
Soviet atomic bomb and recognized that the explosion represented “a major turning point 
in the brief postwar period.”85 David F. Krugler states in This is Only a Test: How 
Washington, D.C., Prepared for Nuclear War that “the war had already proven the 
vulnerability of any home front; now, humankind’s ability to split atoms added a 
frightening dimension.”86 The anxious American public represented a citizenry 
conditioned to world war and determined to avoid a repetition of Pearl Harbor. In a 1949 
article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Anne Wilson Marks dubbed the Soviet 
possession of the bomb the “‘new Pearl Harbor.’” The Ad Council appealed to citizens’ 
fear of a second Pearl Harbor and initiation of World War III to recruit for the GOC. 
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This 1953 advertisement appealed to Americans’ fear of an attack 
like that of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor that led to U.S. entry into World 
War II. Civil defense planners continually invoked the memory of Pearl 
Harbor to recruit GOC volunteers. This particular advertisement appealed 
to women to protect their churches and homes, and to do so fashionably.  
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 In 1956, six years after the reestablishment of the GOC, U.S. Senator Dionisio 
Chavez reminded the President of the Senate, Richard Nixon, that “Hitler and his gang of 
paranoidal desperadoes, used every weapon they could lay their hands on. The Japanese 
did not wait for a Declaration of War to destroy the main part of our fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
and I doubt very much if the men in the Kremlin . . . would hesitate for one minute to use 
the horrifying weapons they claim to be producing.”87 The U.S. Army Center of Military 
History’s History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense summarized the 
generalized concern stemming from the expectation of war and the Soviet bomb, stating 
“The Soviet pattern of action leading up to the atomic achievement appeared to many 
Americans as aggressive, sinister expansion.”88  
In February 1946 Americans reacted with concern to a speech delivered by Soviet 
Premier Joseph Stalin extoling increased industrialization that could supplement the 
Soviet Union’s armed strength.89 This industrialization appeared particularly threatening 
that same year when a communist group in Greece threatened to overthrow the current 
government and potentially collaborate with the Soviet’s communist government.90 Most 
American citizens perceived the resulting Greek civil war as a “Hitler-like fifth-column 
intrusion by the Russians,” when in reality Greeks primarily fought against a monarchy 
supported by Britain.
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 The Soviet Union’s ability to strong-arm Czech president Eduard 
Benes into resignation in February 1948 resulted in a communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia.
92
 The Soviet blockade of West Berlin within Communist East Germany 
months later exacerbated concerns and caused many Americans to draw parallels 
between Hitler’s actions in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s with Soviet communist 
expansion of the 1940s.
93
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Cold War historian Thomas G. Paterson argues that these parallels derived from 
the fact that “many Americans took the unhistorical and illogical view that Russia in the 
1940s would behave as Germany had in the previous decade because of the supposedly 
immutable characteristics of totalitarians.”94 Such comparisons enhanced the value of 
preparedness, ultimately in the form of civil defense and likely in the Ground Observer 
Corps.  
The Soviet detonation of the bomb also legitimized fear of the domestic 
communist threat and validated for many President Harry S. Truman’s loyalty oaths of 
the late 1940s, designed to identify and eliminate communists thought to be working 
within the executive branch.
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 Journalist Drew Pearson stunned Americans when he 
correctly announced that an espionage network consisting of American spies in the U.S. 
during World War II learned how scientists constructed the atomic bomb and reported 
this information to Moscow.
96
 These reports lent credence to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s 
radical claims about the epidemic of domestic communism. 
McCarthy aggravated American concerns in February 1950 with his renowned 
speech to the Ohio County Women’s Republican Club in Wheeling, West Virginia, 
where he displayed a fictitious list of 205 communists supposedly working in the State 
Department.
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 Although the number and names of supposed communists changed 
throughout his speaking tour, journalists and the public initially believed McCarthy’s 
charges because his convictions seemed too strong to question. Historian David M. 
Oshinsky asserts that Americans quickly felt that “One form of totalitarianism had been 
replaced by another. At home, Communist conspirators were working to undermine 
everything that Americans held dear.”98  
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The combined discovery of atomic espionage and the possible existence of the 
discernibly more destructive hydrogen bomb, caused the public to be, in the words of the 
president of the Radio Corporation of America David Sarnoff, “‘very much worried over 
our relations with Russia and the possibility of a world-destroying war because the public 
has learned that Russia has already exploded an A-bomb or an H-bomb.’”99 According to 
a 1950 Public Opinion Quarterly public poll, 86 percent of Americans believed that the 
Soviet Union would employ a hydrogen bomb against the United States.
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 Life echoed 
these grim assumptions, concluding that citizens now lived in the “‘age of obliteration’” 
because the “‘enemy of the free world is implacably determined to destroy the free 
world.’”101 In the mind of the public, diplomacy or international control of the bomb 
seemed improbable because ‘“there can be no compromise and no agreement with Soviet 
Communism.”102  
While citizens became increasingly concerned about the foreign communist threat 
and the domestic “wave of hysteria as a result of current spy trials and loyalty inquiries,” 
the USAF began to reevaluate air defense options.
103
 As early as 1947, the USAF, at that 
time the Army Air Forces, developed an electronic radar warning detection system, but 
Congress’s decision not to support the program hindered its development and greatly 
reduced air defense options.
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 In 1948, to compensate for a limited defense budget and 
strengthen air defense, the USAF proposed reinstating the Ground Observer Corps.
105
 
The Ground Observer Corps activated a program of civilian volunteers at 
observation posts surveying the skies in search of enemy aircraft. Volunteers watched 
from commercial buildings or towers they constructed over schools, hospitals, stores, toll 
stations and any location that granted volunteers unrestricted access to the sky. 
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Volunteers ranged from children to the elderly, war veterans, and teenagers in search of 
social opportunities. 
When observer post volunteers suspected a threat they telephoned the local filter 
center, where volunteers and Air Force personnel plotted and filtered (deemed whether or 
not an airplane was a threat) observer reports. When filter center personnel, and/or early 
warning radar confirmed the threat, the filter center informed the Air Defense Direction 
Center (ADDC), which then alerted and directed interceptor jets to shoot down the enemy 
plane.
106
 ADDC also signaled the Army Antiaircraft command to unleash antiaircraft 
guns and guided missiles upon the threatening aircraft.
107
 An Air Division Commander 
then alerted the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) to signal the air raid 
warning, signaling citizens to retreat from the threat.
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Very little scholarship exists regarding the Ground Observer Corps, and much of 
it overlooks the program’s purpose. Bruce Callander, Korean War veteran and 
contributing editor of Air Force Magazine, argues in his 2006 “The Ground Observer 
Corps” that while no efficient method exists to measure GOC success, the program is 
notable because of civil-military collaborations and the “‘feel-good element’” of 
volunteerism.
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 Military historian and USAF Captain Kenneth Schaffel concludes in his 
1991 The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 
1945-1960 that at the very least the GOC “allowed concerned citizens to become 
informed about, and actively participate in, home air defense operations.”110 In her 
“‘Mightier than Missiles’: The Rhetoric of Civil Defense for Rural American Families, 
1950-1970,” agricultural historian Jenny Barker-Devine contends that the GOC satisfied 
rural citizens’ and farmers’ desires to guard against communism.111 
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Kenton Clymer provides the most recent and thorough analysis of the purpose of 
the GOC in his “The Ground Observer Corps: Public Relations and the Cold War in the 
1950s.”112 Clymer argues that although the GOC did not achieve its defense goals, the 
USAF supported the program because it “served the public relations interests of the Air 
Force, U.S. air defense, and, more generally, the Cold War policies of the United 
States.”113  
In August of 1941, prior to the United States’ entrance into World War II, the 
War Department organized a ground observation system known as the Aircraft Warning 
Service (AWS), formally recognized as the Ground Observer Corps on July 15, 1942.
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The War Department modeled the GOC after the British Royal Observer Corps (ROC), in 
which civilian volunteers responded to air threats by manning observation posts and 
alerted filter centers staffed by civilian and military officials.
115
 Although American GOC 
personnel lacked the organizational experience necessary to detect the Japanese aircraft 
that destroyed Pearl Harbor, the program operated until the summer of 1943, when the 
War Department gradually phased it out due to the absence of other enemy attacks.
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Consideration of the Ground Observer Corps as a realistic form of defense 
derived in part from Britain’s successful World War II model, in which the combination 
of civilian observers and radar proved so successful that intercept aircraft could be 
utilized for other purposes until an actual attack.
117
 Additionally, the efforts of British 
observers and intercept aircraft reduced German air attacks and decreased daytime 
bombings.
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 Chinese and Australians also coordinated successful air warning nets in 
World War II and contributed to the validity of observation as a defense method.
119
 The 
United States’ tradition of observation, couple with the successful history of foreign 
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observation in World War II, positioned the program as a familiar and favorable one to 
planners. 
As the post-war threat emerged, four additional factors arose that necessitated 
novel air defense programs like the GOC. First, the atomic bomb altered the nature of 
war by subjecting arbitrarily all U.S. citizens to the threat of nuclear war. This threat 
reduced the utility of traditional armed forces and caused the Department of Defense to 
espouse alternative defense options.
120
 In his 1949 article in the Public Affairs Bulletin, 
Devan warned congressmen that because the nuclear bomb enhanced the unpredictable 
nature of war the U.S. would not “as in the two World Wars, have a cushion of time 
provided for us by our allies.”121 Civil Defense Administrator Millard Caldwell seconded 
Devan’s concern in a speech that persuaded State Civil Defense Directors to espouse the 
adoption of 24-hour GOC operations known as Operation Skywatch. At a 1952 meeting 
of Civil Defense Directors at the Pentagon, Caldwell argued that “There was a time when 
wars were won and lost by the Army and the Navy and the Air Force. That is no more. 
From 1945 and henceforth wars are going to be lost by the people on Main Street.”122  
Second, the United States Air Force suffered from such a limited defense budget 
that it was forced to utilize World War II detection equipment, extremely inadequate to 
meet the Cold War threat.
123
 In light of both limited congressional funding and defense 
options, the Ground Observer Corps provided an affordable defense enhancement for the 
USAF, as the Air Force could delegate administrative costs to state civil defense 
agencies. An Air Force Public Information Letter of 1952 states that the program 
developed because the Air Force lacked the funds to independently undertake 
observation, and that “Why the AF can’t do this job may be obvious to AF people— but 
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it is not to the public . . . and must be explained in our PI [Public Information] effort.”124 
While the GOC provided the USAF with a method of passing the buck, the GOC 
ultimately remained hampered by a Congress unwilling to match state funding.  
Third, Colorado Civil Defense Director Lt. General Henry L. Larsen contended 
that one of the primary functions of civil defense should be to alert citizens to impending 
attack, providing them with enough time to take shelter. General Larsen asserted that “for 
that reason most of us in civil defense consider the GOC an essential part of CD [civil 
defense].”125 In addition to alerting the ADDC to aerial threats, GOC efforts allowed the 
FCDA to alert civilians to the threat, so they could take cover immediately. 
Fourth, scientists had yet to fully develop the radar necessary to detect and notify 
intercept aircraft to foreign threats, and therefore enemy aircraft flying at low altitudes 
could approach targets undetected.
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 The U.S. developed shared electronic radar warning 
systems along the Canadian border, including the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) 
and the Mid-Canada Line, which could provide early warning to intercept aircraft to 
prevent enemy aircraft and missiles from penetrating the U.S.
127
 Planners hoped that the 
observation network of the GOC would remedy radar gaps — caused by the inability to 
detect radar flying below 6,000 feet — and compensate for radar malfunctions with “the 
oldest method of detection: human eyes and ears.”128  
GOC officials continually cited the lack of fully developed radar as the principle 
reason for the program, and the GOC’s official mission as outlined in the USAF’s 1953 
Ground Observer Corps Policy Guide stated that the GOC operated to provide “low 
altitude visual surveillance” in order to “function as a supplement to radar in the air 
defense system.”129 While Air Force planners clearly stated GOC objectives, USAF 
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officials doubted the legitimacy of the GOC as a defense tool, citing that, at best, GOC 
activity and Air Force intercepts could effectively destroy only 30 percent of enemy 
aircraft.
130
 Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson, Commander of the ADC, admitted that “It is not 
uncommon . . . for me to be asked the question: ‘In the event of enemy attack, could you 
stop all of the enemy bombers and missiles?’ In all honesty I have to answer no.”131 
This reality, no matter how much USAF officials tried publicly to alter it, often 
persuaded members to leave the GOC, as ex-members cited the GOC as “useless against 
missiles or jets” and a “waste of my time.”132 Participating members also experienced 
these thoughts, as articulated by Pamela Burr, ground observer and author of the 1955 
Saturday Evening Post’s “I Am a Sky Sentry.” Burr questioned the purpose of the 
program: “I ask myself: Why do I waste my time up here? Then it seems not only futile 
but downright silly to suppose that a phone call to Trenton could stop that jet or postpone 
that doom.”133  
USAF planners frequently cited the 30 percent figure, but continued to promote 
the GOC for air defense because few other options existed and planners could not throw 
their hands up and inform the public that virtually nothing could prevent an aerial attack. 
Schaffel’s The Emerging Shield reiterates this struggle. He states that even in 1948 USAF 
air defense planner General Gordon Saville “admitted that his interim plan was not 
intended to provide the United States with an invulnerable air defense system,” but the 
GOC could “afford the foundation for a stronger system that could be reinforced and 
improved.”134 Schaffel summarizes Saville’s sentiment by concluding that ultimately the 
GOC proved the best option available and certainly “‘a great deal better than 
nothing.’”135 
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Although USAF planners remained aware that the GOC would be unlikely to 
prevent enemy jets from dropping bombs over the U.S., they cited two aspects of the 
program that could bolster national security. First, a 1952 article in Pegasus magazine 
explained that the value of the USAF program resided in its ability to minimize sustained 
attacks against “strategic bases and industry,” therefore ensuring the United States’ 
ability to retaliate.
136
 Second, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force H. Lee White argued 
in 1953 that while observers located in central U.S. regions might not be able to detect 
threats as they first emerged, they could assist in tracking enemy planes, helping the 
USAF to neutralize the threat.
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Scientists estimated that a Soviet air attack would emerge from the North, 
described by Devan as “the Polar Concept” because the shortest distance between Russia 
and the U.S. is across Alaska and Greenland.
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 USAF planners structured the GOC 
around the Polar Concept, strategically concentrating observer posts and filter centers in 
the northern two-thirds of the country, with the southern-most posts enveloping Chicago 
and Detroit to protect U.S. industrial centers.
139
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This 1954 map of the geographical threat informs readers through 
simple graphics that the “Soviet Union has polar bases from which their 
long-range bombers could fly.” USAF planners organized the GOC 
around the theory that a Soviet attack would likely materialize over the 
U.S.-Canadian border, and initially established posts only in the northern 
two-thirds of the country. 
 
The four factors affecting national security — that the nuclear war subjugated 
everyone to the threat, that the USAF used outdated radar technology, that the GOC 
could alert the FCDA which could warn citizens to take cover, and that radar coverage 
was deficient — coupled with the successful history of observation in World War II, 
situated the GOC as one of the few realistic defense options in the minds of USAF 
personnel. Convinced of the immediacy of the threat and the validity of an observation 
program based on prior success, the Continental Air Command commenced “Operation 
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Lookout” in the fall of 1949 to test the efficiency of ground observation.140 The test 
proved so successful that the Secretary of Defense met with the governors of the 
northeastern states and their staffs, including Arthur M. Thurston, Superintendent of the 
Indiana State Police and the Director of Civil Defense for Indiana, to reestablish the 
observation program.
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As early as 1949, GOC participants recognized that miscommunication could 
significantly disrupt operations, as Thurston commented to Hal Bergman of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, “it would not be very good management to create a state 
organization that would have to be disbanded at a later date in the event it did not 
conform with Federal directives.”142 However, Thurston’s letter indicates that program 
officials understood from the beginning that the USAF would be responsible for overall 
GOC operations.
143
 Thurston concluded his letter by indicating that Indiana would 
establish 349 observation posts in sixty counties in the northern area of the state.
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Indiana’s GOC organization centered around the Civil Defense Act of 1949, 
which established the state’s Department of Civil Defense, controlled by the governor 
who constructed and executed a state civil defense plan and who was supported by a civil 
defense advisory council.
145
 The act required the Governor to coordinate plans “to the 
fullest possible extent” with other states and with federal plans, but prescribed no specific 
method. This vagueness contributed to organizational problems, expressed in master’s 
candidate Edith Marie Caravatta’s 1955 thesis, in which she states “there is no overall 
coordination of the Ground Observer Corps program, either within the individual states 
or nationally.”146 According to the act, the superintendent of state police (in the case of 
Indiana Arthur M. Thurston) operated as director of the department and “by virtue” all 
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state police employees were required to conduct civil defense duties.
147
 On a micro level, 
the act appealed to each city mayor to establish a local civil defense organization and 
appoint a director to organize and administer the GOC and select post supervisors.
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A preliminary conference of the Indiana Department of Civil Defense further 
situated the GOC within broader civil defense plans, as officials outlined eight functions 
of the state defense program, categorizing the GOC within the Administration function, 
among other functions such as Medical and Health Services and Civilian War Aid.
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State agencies like the State Police, Attorney General and State Press Association and 
private agencies such as the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and labor 
associations supported the Administrative division.
150
  
Scientists’ estimation that Soviet aircraft would emerge over the North Pole 
induced questions about Indiana’s vulnerability. The Indiana Civil Defense Sentinel, 
published by the Indiana Department of Civil Defense, offered explanations similar to 
those of the Pegasus article and General White’s remarks.151 According to the bulletin, 
Governor Henry F. Schricker warned that “Hoosiers should be alert to protect vital 
Indiana war industries if hostilities should break out.”152 Thurston warned that Lake 
County, part of Chicago’s urban industrial area, could be a site of an enemy attack.153 
Concerned Indiana citizen Thomas H. Roberts reiterated the need to protect Indiana, 
writing to Schricker that his family lived in “the highly industrialized Calumet area. I am 
sure you are aware that this area is a likely target for enemy attack.”154 These statements 
illustrate that the value of Indiana observation lay not in detecting an emerging threat, but 
in tracking it to preserve industrial areas and ensure the ability to retaliate.  
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Thurston described to Bergman, of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, that 
state plans were still in the “drafting” phase, but that he would be attending an Air Force 
conference at the Pentagon on January 19, 1950 to be briefed on the GOC prior to the 
official USAF initiation.
155
 Thurston’s conference in Washington inspired a preliminary 
meeting in Schricker’s office with the Civilian Defense Council to prepare Indiana to join 
the AWS, the initial name of the Cold War GOC.
156
 Meeting attendees assembled a staff 
of five people from various state departments to organize the program, which involved 
selecting leaders at city and county levels.
157
 Schricker wrote in a letter to U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Louis Johnson that he hoped to implement the program thirty days from the 
planning meeting.
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According to articles and letters sent to Schricker in 1950 from other governors, 
program planning advanced more quickly and decidedly in Indiana than in other 
participating states.
159
 Unsure as to how to proceed after the Washington conference, 
Illinois Governor and future presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson appealed to Schricker 
for advice.
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 Schricker detailed Indiana’s planning process for Stevenson, stating that he 
would first contact every mayor, town board president and all “peace officers on every 
level throughout the state.”161 He then explained that these officials would utilize their 
positions of leadership to recruit volunteers for the AWS.
162
 After contacting the mayors 
and town board presidents, Schricker hosted a luncheon for them on March 9, which he 
described to Ohio Governor Frank Lausche “to be a very effective means of presenting 
the problem to a large group in a short period, and it was most effective in stimulating 
county organization in the state.”163 Schricker’s briefing evidently initiated widespread 
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county participation in the program, as only eleven days after the meeting the Department 
of Civil Defense for Indiana compiled a list of observer posts for each county.
164
 
On March 16, 1950, a mock air attack over Indiana illustrated the shortcomings of 
radar, as B-26 bombers flown by members of the Air National Guard of Indiana, 
Missouri and Illinois proceeded “completely undetected” by radar at Fort Harrison, the 
state’s only warning facility.165 The Indiana Civil Defense Sentinel stated that commercial 
and private aircraft jammed the radar and that the B-26 bombers evaded detection by 
flying at an altitude of 3,000 feet.
166
 The bulletin concluded that the inability to detect 
successfully the aircraft resulted in the various observer posts being constructed 
throughout the state so as to “guard against this eventuality in war.”167  
Following the alarming mock air attack, municipal and county officials named 
Civil Defense Directors in 51 Indiana counties.
168
 The Directors established observer 
posts in the northern two-thirds of Indiana, where volunteers gathered when solicited by 
USAF officials during actual or anticipated attacks.
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  Later, at the initiation of 
Operation Skywatch in 1952, observers continuously manned towers, rather than waiting 
to be called to them. In addition to mock attacks, observers and supervisors received 
training through the “Correspondence Course Method,” in which instructional booklets 
taught participants how to identify threatening aircraft.
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USAF officials of the observation post section, an area located within filter 
centers, also trained observers and observer post personnel through Mobile Training 
Teams that traveled from post to post offering instruction.
171
 These teams assisted chief 
observers with recruiting, kept posts in continuous operation, and counteracted “to some 
extent the insularity of the individual county and town civil defense organizations.”172 
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According to the 1950 The Aircraft Warning Service of the U.S. Air Force, the 
State Civil Defense Director (Thurston) appointed local observation post supervisors, 
who determined the location of individual observation posts in order to “provide uniform 
coverage of the air surveillance area.”173 Supervisors designated posts approximately 
eight miles apart, based on clear visibility and telephone availability necessary for 
observers to make collect calls compensated by the federal government.
174
 Local civil 
defense organizations often utilized extant structures for observation towers, and local 
merchants frequently donated materials to build new watchtowers.
175
 Supervisors 
recruited volunteers and were supported by a chief observer, two deputy chief observers 
and roughly twenty observers.
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USAF staff located filter centers in cities or communication centers and required 
500 volunteers to staff each center.
177
 Filter centers contained a plotting board, where 10 
to 15 plotters displayed information relayed from observer reports to illustrate the path of 
the reported aircraft, and four to six filterers evaluated the plotted information and alerted 
ADDC when necessary.
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 Although state civil defense agencies recruited for and administered the program, 
USAF staff trained and assisted with operations at observer posts and filter centers.
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USAF did not clearly define these roles, creating a problem aggravated by the Air 
Force’s failure to develop a definitive organizational policy. William R. Porretto argues 
that because of the lack of policy  
not all civilian officials understood which functions fell to the 
responsibilities of the several states and which ones were to be handled by 
the Air Force; and there were areas wherein the Air Force that had been 
forced to assume responsibilities which the states could not or would not 
assume.
180
 
 
52 
Another organizational problem emerged because the USAF did not include observer 
posts in its chain of command.
181
  
 
The USAF was responsible for filter center operations, but county 
civil defense directors, under guidance of the FCDA, presided over 
observation posts. This divided responsibility caused communication and 
organizational problems in the GOC. The complex organization channels 
illustrated in this 1953 flow chart perplexed even USAF and local civil 
defense program participants. 
 
USAF personnel coordinated with observers through training sessions and by 
attending promotional events, but ultimately state and county civil defense directors 
presided over observer posts. According to Caravatta, to make matters worse, 
occasionally local civil defense directors stopped attending to posts and the GOC in 
general after appointing the post supervisors and chief observers.
182
 To remedy these 
flaws the USAF appointed a Coordinator to each state to act as a liaison between the state 
and the USAF, but problems persisted.
183
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Although the GOC was part of the United States Civil Defense Corps, questions 
regarding various responsibilities and funding continually plagued GOC personnel.
184
 At 
the Ground Observer Corps Conference of January 1954, USAF officials met with Civil 
Defense Directors to discuss organizational issues affecting the program.
185
 Proceedings 
of the meeting indicate the degree of friction between the two groups and even among the 
state officials. 
During the conference, Civil Defense Representative for Wisconsin General R.J. 
Olson stated that because of the “differences of opinion and differences in laws between 
the several states, we cannot come up with a uniform policy.”186 After heated discussions 
about the topic, Major F.G. Woodward of the Eastern Air Defense Force (EADF) 
concluded that obvious organizational complications existed and that the issues resulted 
from the bifurcated “division of responsibility.”187 Woodward summarized that the 
division created “confusion in the minds of the public and even among public 
officials.”188 GOC officials never wholly resolved these problems, despite joint meetings 
and public campaigns.  
Support for the GOC increased when, to the alarm of USAF planners, North 
Korean forces invaded South Korea across the 38
th
 parallel on June 25, 1950. The 
invasion caused U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to assume that “the Communist attack on Korea could be the prelude to a 
Soviet-inspired general war.”189 The invasion inspired a significant increase in defense 
and observation, as a “Soviet first strike could not be considered any more improbable or 
irrational than Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.”190 According to Lisle Rose, this Korean 
War caused the American citizens, ranging from housewives to lawyers, teachers and 
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advertising men, to assume that “the Kremlin had unquestionably ordered the North 
Korean attack, and it was time to stand up to the Soviets.”191 This fear prompted 
Congress to allocate approximately $40 million to defense and USAF programs, allowing 
the USAF to improve radar more quickly.
192
 Following the invasion, USAF officials 
determined that the GOC was woefully inefficient and planned to install 26 filter 
centers.
193
  Furthermore, air tests demonstrated that participants lacked the training 
necessary for effective observation, alerting and tracking.
194
   
Announcement of the Korean conflict increased Indiana preparations and in 
December 1950 USAF Assistant Air Adjutant General Major Henry W. Spiller notified 
supervisors that “in the event of war, the Ground Observer Corps will operate 24 hours a 
day in all seasons of the year,” a prelude to the 24-hours operations to come.195 By this 
time, the USAF had partially constructed a filter center in Indiana, located in the South 
Bend area.
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 Thurston’s invitations to the Governor’s Civil Defense Advisory Council of 
December referenced the international situation, as he stated “Unfavorable developments 
in the Korean war have increased the urgency of the Civil Defense program. Fast moving 
programs on the federal front requires [sic] certain action on our part.”197 
A Progress Report of the Indiana Department of Civil Defense from December 
20, 1950 summarized the year’s events and celebrated the appointment of a civil defense 
director in every county.
198
 The report recognized that a USAF exercise of November 4 
and 5 resulted in 83 of 130 posts participating, with a total of 2096 calls made to the 
South Bend filter center.
199
 The report also determined that although participating posts 
performed well, “the exercise demonstrated that a great deal of further stimulation, 
recruiting and training will be needed before all the observation posts in Indiana are in 
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effective operation.”200 The report continued that upon suggestion of the federal 
government and in light of the international situation, the Civil Defense Act of 1949 
deserved revision.
201
 Such proposed changes included allowing counties to allocate 
separate funds for civil defense activities.
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In 1952, two years after the official reestablishment of the GOC, USAF officials 
fought to overcome citizen apathy in what they considered an increasingly hostile 
international environment by placing the program on 24-hour operations, known as 
Operation Skywatch. The fact that observers, rather than radar, identified Soviet contrails 
near Nunivak Island, just off the southern coast of Alaska, confirmed the validity of the 
GOC.
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The arms race between the United States and Soviet Union intensified, as the 
Chinese intervened in the Korean War on the side of the North Koreans and peace 
negotiations stalled.
204
 In order to preclude a Soviet attack, American planners sought to 
demonstrate superior military strength by building additional atomic weapons. Cold War 
scholar Melvyn P. Leffler asserts that planners wanted to increase armaments “to the 
point where the Soviets would not dare to take an escalatory step.”205 
The escalation of tension inspired further defense precautions. Without consulting 
state defense directors, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg 
announced to the nation that Operation Skywatch would begin May 17, 1952, provoking 
backlash from state directors at the National Association of State Civil Defense Directors, 
who felt that the decision violated USAF’s authority.206  
The controversy over Skywatch revealed that the Air Force needed to more fully 
inform the public and state directors of the purpose of increased observation.
207
 Although 
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an Air Force Public Information Letter assumed the state directors’ protests derived from 
a lack of GOC volunteers, state directors cited a 1949 agreement with the USAF to only 
embark on 24-hour surveillance in case of war.
208
 State directors also resented the 
USAF’s failure to inform them ahead of the increased observation because state and local 
agencies had to absorb the cost of implementing the expanded program.
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The protest led to postponement of Skywatch and the subsequent invitation to 
state directors to a conference at the Pentagon on June 17, 1952.
210
 FCDA Speaker 
Millard Caldwell empathized with state directors, stating “The few people that you have 
been able to interest in civil defense, over great odds, you have to share with the Air 
Force.” Further, he hoped that “this meeting will set a pattern of straight, across-the-
board, discussion between you and the Defense Department on all of its problems.”211 
Caldwell’s and USAF speakers’ reiteration of the need for united efforts and consistent 
public information resulted in the directors voting for Skywatch to commence July 14.
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On Skywatch’s inception, 27 of the 36 states within the GOC participated in 24-hour 
operations, including the northern area of Indiana.
213
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This map reflects the Polar Concept by placing observation posts 
and filter centers in the northern part of the country, reinforcing the 
northern border by requiring volunteers to work around the clock in the 
Skywatch area. 
 
Air Force representatives, FCDA officials, the Advertising Council, and Spencer 
Quick (White House Liaison for the Advertising Council) engaged in a Joint Public 
Education Program in preparation for Skywatch and to correct messages contradictory to 
those of the Air Force about defense preparations and that caused “the people of this 
country to have a false sense of security.”214 The public campaign utilized Edward R. 
Murrow’s “See It Now” program to gain recognition for the GOC, as well as information 
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kits that included fact sheets, maps and official statements.
215
 The campaign’s theme 
became “The time for air defense is NOW” in order to emphasize inadequate air defense 
and enemy capability.
216
 The joint campaign provided the USAF with an opportunity to 
strengthen communication with state and local directors with letters to state governors 
and defense directors both informing them of Skywatch activities and requesting their 
suggestions.
217
  
The stated purpose of the GOC continued to be the reinforcement of radar 
coverage, but planners also hoped that the volunteer force comprised of patriotic civilians 
could deter a Soviet attack simply by demonstrating their organization and preparation. 
This secondary purpose illustrates that planners had begun to recognize the ideological 
value of the GOC. Executive Assistant Administrator of the FCDA Justice M. Chambers 
insisted that a deterrent to Communist aggression “must consist of something more than a 
single, terrifying weapon.” It required “a total defensive and offensive force so strong 
that the enemy will not dare to test it.”218  
This emphasis on deterrence aligned with intensified rhetoric about Soviet 
communism among congressmen. Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey asserted in June 
that, “To the Kremlin pacifism is one of the greatest of all crimes. War is not only a 
legitimate instrument of policy . . . it is a requisite instrument of policy.”219 President 
Harry S. Truman reinforced the importance of a united volunteer defense force by 
publicly endorsing Skywatch two days prior to its commencement. He echoed the GOC’s 
value as a deterrent by proclaiming “Our greatest hopes for peace lie in being so strong 
and so well prepared that our enemies will not dare attack.”220 He asserted that GOC 
volunteers contributed to this aim by “helping prevent the war none of us wants to 
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happen.”221 Eventually even television stars accepted this idea of deterrence, as Desi 
Arnaz suggested to Lucille Ball in a television spot “‘Maybe they’ll think we’re too tough 
to tackle, and there won’t be any war.’”222 
While GOC purposes shifted slightly in 1952, USAF officials reevaluated and 
maintained original goals and remained aware of program deficiencies. As USAF 
Commanding General Benjamin W. Childlaw stated: “We do not harbor any delusions 
that our air defense system is an absolute stone wall which will prevent any enemy 
aircraft from dropping bombs on American soil.”223 According to Childlaw, by “detecting 
them [enemy aircraft] in sufficient time before they reach their targets, however, we can 
take effective steps to reduce the damage inflicted by a raid.”224 
Although the continuous operations of Skywatch enhanced the perception of the 
GOC as a valid defense tool and garnered popularity among volunteers, communication 
issues persisted at an organizational level.
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 In a telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, ADC personnel processing enrollments complained that they could not keep up 
with the high volume of citizens who wished to volunteer after hearing radio 
advertisements, describing it as a “recruitment” problem. The telegram reports that the 
ADC had “received several complaints concerning people desiring to volunteer after 
hearing radio plugs and having difficulty in actual recruitment.”226 Despite these 
problems, Operation Skywatch ultimately bolstered air defense, as ADC’s ability to 
detect aircraft improved to a ceiling of 4,000 feet.
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In 1953, as the Korean War came to a close, Air Force personnel continued to 
emphasize the need for the GOC.
228
 While the USAF continued to promote the GOC as a 
deterrent force and tool to minimize enemy attack, The Aircraft Flash increasingly 
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publicized stories about unconventional posts and alternative purposes such as weather 
and smoke spotting. As GOC activities diversified, planners continued to develop the 
NIKE guided missile, which allowed the USAF to more precisely target and destroy 
enemy aircraft before their pilots could unleash nuclear bombs.
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President Dwight D. Eisenhower released an endorsement of the program in 1953 
(located below) that tried to retain GOC participants after the Korean War. The 
advertisement promoted increased communication between participating states and the 
Air Force, encouraging local civil defense agencies to tailor the message to their 
constituencies by inserting the local defense director’s name and phone number.230 
According to James M. Lambie, Special Assistant in the White House, Eisenhower’s 
message “gave a big and much needed lift to the campaign, which has been going rather 
well considering everything.”231  
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In 1953 the Ad Council hoped to attract volunteers with this 
advertisement in which President Eisenhower promoted the GOC. 
Mimicking the traditional Uncle Sam propaganda poster employed in 
World War I, Eisenhower appeals to individuals with his solemn gaze and 
“YOU.” The advertisement attempts to overcome organizational problems 
by requesting that local directors add their contact phone number in this 
nationally distributed advertisement. 
 
The Joint Publicity Program, endorsement of Eisenhower, and Skywatch activities 
injected energy into the GOC, reflected in the GOC reports of Director of Civil Air 
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Defense and USAF Colonel Broun H. Mayall in 1954. Mayall stated in March that based 
on the “increase in active and enrolled observation post volunteers that the state civil 
defense agencies are becoming more effective in their civil defense programs.”232 In 
addition to improved state operations, the GOC as a whole “continues to show healthy 
growth,” which Mayall considered notable, as the “number of 24-hour posts remains 
nearly constant in the face of the hardship of this winter season.”233  
In 1954, GOC personnel participated in activities not originally included in the 
GOC’s mission, such as tornado spotting and rescuing pilots and parachutists in distress. 
GOC observers in Albany, New York identified Lt. Frank Robins’ plane, which had 
veered off course, and formed a makeshift runway by creating two parallel lines with the 
lights of their cars, successfully guiding Lt. Robins to a safe landing in a field.
234
 In 
addition to distress missions, The Aircraft Flash reported that “severe weather reporting 
is as natural and essential for the GOC as the spotting and reporting of aircraft.”235 
County GOC officials in Indiana undertook a tornado warning in 1954, but Thurston’s 
successor, Frederick T. Cretors, believed that this activity revealed communication 
problems because county officials issued a red warning about the impending tornado, a 
color reserved only for the highest security threats.
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Cretors not only directed weather reporting, but developed a unique and efficient 
alerting system using short-wave radios, by which all posts in the state could be 
operationally ready within 24 minutes.
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 Cretors described that approximately 150 posts 
in the southern area of the state did not participate in Skywatch and of those that did 
participate, some operated only partially.
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 GOC Coordinator for the State of Indiana, Lt. 
Col. James T. Emott reported that the Air Force requested all participating states to 
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develop a plan that could summon observers to posts in an emergency should telephone 
communication fail. Cretors thereby designed a system in which the USAF alerted all 
state police posts, who then notified local police, who alerted the local civil defense 
directors, who informed all observation post supervisors to organize volunteers.
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Emott’s justification of the defense system again referenced the lessons of World War II, 
contending “this alerting system is a vital part of our defenses against another Pearl 
Harbor.”240 
In 1955, The Aircraft Flash asserted that the GOC “is no longer in the test stage” 
and a 1958 article recognized that by 1955 the program had “reached its maximum 
growth.”241 The magazine cited the development of two new Soviet jet bombers, which 
increased “the Soviet’s capability to conduct an air attack against the United States,” as 
one factor to increase vigilance.
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 New weapons and continued friction between the 
ideological systems of the Soviet Union and U.S. resulted in the development of 
CONELRAD, radar used to disorient enemy flight patterns, and the expansion of the 
GOC to all 48 states in July on the third anniversary of Skywatch.
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 The expansion was 
consistent with The Aircraft Flash’s belief that the GOC represented a “vast departure 
from the know-nothing, do-nothing school of critics.”244  
Hector Perrier, who worked closely with GOC planners in his work for the Ad 
Council, predicted that the expansion of the GOC to an additional 12 southern and 
southwestern states would be challenging in terms of recruitment of interested citizens 
because the states lacked local defense organizations.
245
 As predicted, USAF officials 
found the July 1955 expansion problematic due to lack of appropriate filter center sites 
and state coordinators.
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 Communication problems like those in other states between the 
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USAF and local defense officials, plus a shortage of willing coordinators, and “technical 
difficulties” regarding the installation of filter centers added new challenges.247 These 
difficulties harkened back to the contentious 1954 meeting of USAF and civil defense 
directors, in which Wisconsin civil defense representative General R.J. Olson lamented 
that mobile filter center teams acted “without my knowledge and without my approval 
and began installing telephones in some of the Observation Posts at Air Force 
expense.”248 
Regardless of the organizational setbacks, Perrier argued in September 1955 that 
“despite the general feeling that the Kremlin has adopted a less aggressive attitude toward 
the free world, recruitment in the GOC continues to increase steadily.”249 The 
participation of the Navy and the Marines in the GOC also strengthened the program by 
providing increased detection coverage with picket ships equipped with radar that 
extended the DEW line and contributed to a defense system that USAF planners hoped 
would one day operate without civilian volunteers.
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Four Aircraft Flash issues printed in 1955 include sections entitled “Radar and the 
GOC.” This sudden emphasis on radar development hinted at future capabilities of radar 
that planners hoped would liberate GOC volunteers.
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 In a letter to Secretary of Defense 
Charles Wilson, released one day prior to the third anniversary of Operation Skywatch, 
President Eisenhower asserted that the GOC was fulfilling the program’s secondary 
purpose, stating that GOC participants “have undoubtedly strengthened the capabilities of 
our continental defense system, and in so doing they have helped to deter aggression.”252 
The consolidation of filter centers, intended to free some military personnel and 
streamline operations, made 1956 a transitional year.
253
 An article described an “element 
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of sadness in the situation, for these changes mean the breaking of ties of sentiment and 
respectful affection between the community, the volunteers and the military.”254 In 
addition to the consolidation, the Air Force put eight filter centers, including Terre Haute, 
on Ready Reserve status, meaning that they would no longer operate 24-hours per day 
and instead the USAF would call observers to posts only during an emergency like the 
situation in 1949-1952.
255
 Additionally, USAF personnel began referring to all GOC 
activities as Operation Skywatch in 1956.
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The proverbial writing on the wall materialized in April of 1957, when Director of 
Civil Air Defense and USAF Colonel Broun H. Mayall informed attendees at the 
Conference of the National Association of State Civil Defense Directors that while 
attendees previously considered the “development of our radar network as something still 
on the way,” he asserted “we are well on the job now.”257 Mayall informed the directors 
that officials had nearly completed the Mid-Canada line and the DEW line near the Arctic 
Circle and that Navy radar extended the detection line to the East. He insisted that 
although radar was not “one-hundred-percent” completed, it moved the “barriers of our 
air defense system farther and farther from our homeland.”258 Despite these radar 
improvements, Col. Owen F. Clarke, USAF Ground Observer Corps Project Officer, 
argued that “‘continuation of educational and indoctrinational aspects of the GOC 
program should be maintained with fullest vigor and at all levels.’”259 Clarke considered 
maintenance of the program necessary because “‘no other group is better equipped and 
positioned at [the] community level to take an active hand in the enlightening of all 
citizens on the dangers confronting this nation in the atomic age.’”260 Until this statement, 
published in The Aircraft Flash, planners had never so explicitly expressed that the GOC 
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served to garner ideological support for the Cold War and educate citizens about the 
Soviet threat. 
As purposes changed, USAF officials decided to maintain 24-hour posts only in 
coastal and border areas, excluding all interior posts.
261
  Mayall’s briefing evinced USAF 
personnel’s determination to avoid communication problems, as Mayall stated that USAF 
planners would first inform state defense directors of these changes and allow the 
directors to implement at their discretion these changes in their areas of jurisdiction.
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In a confidential report, Perrier of the Ad Council inferred that “While the 
decision to end the campaign is not yet final, I think we can assume that the job is done 
and we can stop everything with the exception of . . . GOC week.”263 By November 1957, 
the USAF had definitively decided to place the entire country on “Ready Reserve,” 
essentially but unofficially terminating the program.
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 In a briefing to state Civil Defense 
directors, Colonel Owen F. Clarke of the GOC Project Office cited “technological 
advances in electronic air surveillance systems” and increased speeds of enemy jet 
bombers that negated the efficiency of “manual capabilities” as reasons for these program 
changes.
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Although planners terminated the program unofficially, Clarke argued that the 
GOC “Ready Reserve” should be maintained, to be summoned during emergencies and 
because of the GOC’s ability to report severe weather, aid distressed airplanes, spot 
UFO’s and educate citizens about the general communist threat.266 With altered purposes, 
the USAF published a series of Aircraft Flash articles in 1958 entitled “On Communism” 
to emphasize the ideological threat of communism, rather than its physical threat. The 
series generally neglected to mention Soviet defense threats and instead educated readers 
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about the history of communism and Marxist theory, informing observers that 
“Communists are not only atheistic but militantly opposed to any spiritual way of life.”267 
Such articles indeed served to reinforce Cold War objectives, and other Aircraft Flash 
articles such as “Youth in the GOC” promoted the principles of democracy and 
volunteerism. Youth observer Bobbie Umberger wrote to the magazine that the GOC 
provided him with an opportunity to utilize his free time for productive, voluntary 
purposes: 
Rather than reading obscene literature, we are studying textbooks on 
navigation, meteorology, map reading and radio; rather than ‘breaking and 
entering,’ we are gaining experience in leadership through recruiting and 
keeping post records; rather than loafing on the streets we have spent over 
4,000 hours in our Ground Observer work.
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Few records exist about the termination of the GOC in Indiana, but The Indiana 
Civil Defender, the renamed bulletin of the Department of Civil Defense, revealed that 
the Secretary of the Air Force announced the official end of the GOC as of January 31, 
1959.
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 The bulletin almost wistfully states that the U.S “is geared to the substitution of 
machines for manpower . . . and we accept this theory of progress.”270 The Defender 
lamented the conclusion of the program, but congratulated its participants for 
successfully deterring attack, going so far as to claim the GOC may have been “the one 
final deterrent to an attack on the country by a calculating enemy.”271 As with the 
USAF’s hopes, Indiana’s Department of Civil Defense tried to convert GOC participants 
into stewards of vigilance and democracy, identifying them as ideal candidates because 
“through past training, [they] have a knowledge and understanding of the ‘threat’ of 
nuclear attack,” and that therefore they should “continue patriotically to serve the nation 
in other phases of Civil Defense.”272 
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The final, January 1959 Dedicatory Edition of The Aircraft Flash celebrated the 
democratic components of the GOC — “patriotic loyalty, “spiritual unity,” “community 
responsibility,” “a people’s movement” — and encouraged participants to engage in 
similar programs.
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 Perhaps President Eisenhower made the most striking statement 
about the GOC’s eventual value. He told GOC volunteers “I hope that you will continue 
to provide leadership in other fields of civil defense and by your example stimulate many 
other Americans to share in the task required to sustain our democratic way of life.”274 
As the GOC came to a close, planners reiterated to participants that the Cold War 
persisted even if the program did not, appealing to them to act as conduits of information 
about the threat to the general population. While this purpose was more pronounced in 
the later years of the program, USAF planners’ early understanding of the limitations of 
the GOC, but continued maintenance of it, indicates they had already recognized the 
value of the program in providing civilian support for the Cold War. Ultimately, while 
USAF planners understood the limitations of the GOC, the few defense options available 
and Americans’ preoccupation with the resumption of world war motivated planners to 
promote the program’s defensive value. In the years following the Korean War and until 
the GOC’s termination in early 1959, officials increasingly realized the program’s utility 
as a vehicle to impress upon citizens the objectives of the Cold War, the Soviet 
communist threat, and traditional American values of volunteerism and individualism. 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
Chapter 3: The GOC Comes Home: 
“You Who Stand and Watch Also Serve”275 
 
Although the Ground Observer Corps proved ineffective as an early warning 
defense tool, the rhetoric of the United States Air Force and Federal Civil Defense 
Administration indicates they believed that people willingly working together in the GOC 
could help deter the Soviet air threat. In other words, how citizens defended their country 
was as important as what they defended. This “American-style civil defense” espoused 
individualism, volunteerism and civic responsibility, touted as the antithesis of 
communist principles.
276
 These efforts strengthened communities in a period of “cold 
war” and exceeded Air Force objectives to strengthen air defense. 
In order to demonstrate how the efforts of GOC volunteers uniquely impacted 
communities, I compare the GOC to a similar civil defense organization, the Civil Air 
Patrol (CAP). I also study three regions that participated in the GOC, predicated on 
regional industries or activities: rural areas comprised primarily of farmers, metropolitan 
areas, and areas with existing observation posts, chiefly along the northern border. While 
these three sectors participated in the program differently, the GOC strengthened 
communities in each and individual preparation ultimately benefited one's neighbors and 
community. 
Examination of the type of civil defense crafted by Congress and executed by the 
FCDA in the 1950s explains the GOC’s emphasis of volunteerism and individualism, 
which ultimately improved the safety and “spiritual unity” of American communities. 
Historian Laura McEnaney theorizes that a privatized or “self-help” civil defense system 
emerged in the early 1950s because of the World War I precedent of grassroots help, the 
federal government's financial inability to support a national defense program, and the 
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ideological battle occurring in Congress regarding the role of government in the early 
atomic era.
277
 She reports that the appointment of civilian leaders of the FCDA reflected 
the notion that “a military-run civil defense program was antidemocratic and antithetical 
to the ‘American way of life.’”278  
Congress passed the 1951 Federal Civil Defense Act with the condition that states 
and municipalities bore the brunt of the responsibility for instituting civil defense.
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Passing this act was ideologically and politically safe because it prevented the emergence 
of a garrison state by putting the onus of civil defense on individuals.  This “self-help” 
civil defense program resulted in a bomb shelter system that “was premised on 
suburbanization and home ownership, twin phenomena that included far more whites 
than nonwhites” and evacuation plans predicated on the private ownership of cars, 
“leaving poor people dependent upon inadequate public transportation or their own feet 
to flea [flee] cities.”280 Because only the financially secure living in the suburbs — 
generally white, middle-class Americans — could construct a bomb shelter beneath their 
houses or afford a car necessary to evacuate, GOC observation posts and filters centers 
represented one of the few truly communal resources in the realm of civil defense. 
Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman summarize the paradoxical nature of this 
“American-style civil defense” promoted by the FCDA and USAF. They assert that it 
“depended on traditional American values: on the one hand, rugged individualism — the 
private virtues of self-reliance, self-discipline, and do-it-yourself pragmatism; on the 
other hand, civic responsibility — the public virtues of neighborliness, mutual assistance, 
community spirit and local pride.”281 In keeping with the battle of ideologies 
characterizing the Cold War, U.S. civil defense programs marketed the importance of 
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individual and voluntary efforts, contrasting them with the Soviet Union's observation 
program that employed mandatory participation.
282
 When crafting the U.S. system of 
civil defense, FCDA officials and members of Congress made sure to avoid parallels with 
Soviet defense, avoiding and criticizing public shelters as “'communistic' while private 
sheltering was valorized as a uniquely 'American-style' militarization.”283 
These officials frequently delineated the differences between the two civil defense 
systems in order to tie national security to political ideology, virtually equating the 
communist and atomic threats. A Congressional Record article shows this link by 
describing the GOC's possible participation in Loyalty Day through public 
demonstrations of observation. The article argues that Congress's potential recognition of 
Loyalty Day would “serve to deal a devastating but bloodless blow at the unthinking 
persons who would attempt to rally public opinion behind the false ideology of 
communism.”284  
In a series of articles entitled “On Communism” printed in The Aircraft Flash, 
authors advised GOC readers that an understanding of Soviet ideology supplemented 
observation in safeguarding the nation, contending “Faith in the evolutionary democratic 
process toward justice, combined with a broader knowledge . . . of Communist evil, will 
justify and support the sacrifice and patience required of all free people to close this ugly 
phase of world history.”285 Similarly, a 1950 editorial in The Indiana Civil Defense 
Sentinel reflected a belief that practicing democracy was tantamount to national defense 
and observation.
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 The editorial stated “There is one vital element of our strength that 
cannot be measured in physical terms. That is our democracy — our freedom . . . there 
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must be the deeper and more effective strength of a free people fully determined to 
preserve their freedom.”  
Through this rhetoric, the civil defense establishment tied ideology to defense 
against the atomic threat. Grossman and Oakes assert that “demonstrations of public 
resolve were part of an effort to deter the Soviet Union from expanding its influence by 
means that would precipitate just such an event [nuclear attack].”287 Demonstrating one's 
understanding and abhorrence of communism became as important to national security as 
participating in “American-style civil defense.” McEnaney theorizes that “practicing 
national security meant not engaging in certain kinds of behaviors that could be judged 
suspicious or subversive.”288 
GOC participants validated the program by defending their country in a way that 
represented democratic ideals. While participation numbers remained relatively low 
throughout the duration of the program, between 350,000 and 400,000 volunteers, U.S. 
Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg valued the program primarily 
because it facilitated the practice of democracy. He proclaimed “that the progress has 
been heartening for the reason that we have chosen to go about this job in the democratic 
way, counting upon the sense of civic duty which in the past has always prompted 
Americans to defend their freedom.”289 
The USAF and FCDA not only employed traditional U.S. values in the practice of 
civil defense, but the organizations claimed civil defense could strengthen these values. 
McEnaney cites the Powner family who, as participants in Project Hideaway, voluntarily 
lived in a bomb shelter at Princeton University for two weeks, allowing a university 
psychology professor to study the effects of prolonged shelter life.
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 The study 
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concluded that the family, who played games together and whose father spent rare time 
with his children, actually relished their stay, citing that the “enforced togetherness” 
resulted in a closer family.
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 The GOC promoted their civil defense program similarly, 
as an opportunity for families, neighbors and community members to spend quality time 
together through the shared objective of improving national security. 
It is important to note that while the majority of Americans feared the atomic 
threat, they were discernibly apathetic to civil defense and the GOC. However, those 
citizens that participated in the program did so zealously. A civil defense director in 
Concord, New Hampshire, Rear Admiral Cornelius A. Brinkmann, expressed frustration 
with the unwillingness of residents to volunteer at their local GOC post, lamenting 
“They’ll make a money contribution to a good cause any time you ask them, or they’ll 
give you some time for a one-shot operation but it’s hard to get them to promise to give 
their time regularly.”292 
Comparison with the CAP demonstrates the unique, inclusive nature of the GOC 
predicated on “American-style civil defense.” GOC volunteers represented nearly every 
demographic in the country with the exception of African Americans, and included the 
blind, centenarians, displaced persons from World War II, women, veterans, Native 
Americans, Boy and Girl Scouts, prisoners and monks. An Aircraft Flash article from 
April 1958 summarized the diverse community involvement, stating that at the Eunice, 
New Mexico post, “All components of the community are represented in the Eunice GOC 
— local government, social and professional clubs, the church, the school, business and 
industry, news media and the home” and that “the social and professional activities of 
Eunice volunteers have helped to knit close ties of unity and singleness of purpose.”293 
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The type of participants and activities related to the GOC demonstrate how the 
program connected diverse groups within communities, unlike other civic or civil defense 
groups of the period. Pamela Burr, author of “I Am a Sky Sentry,” colorfully recalls her 
participation at the observation post located on top of the Bryn Mawr Hospital in 
Pennsylvania.
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 She describes participants as a “motley group” that included a thirteen-
year-old boy, a housewife and an oil executive. Because the tower sat atop the hospital, 
various patients and staff interacted with GOC volunteers. Burr describes an incident that 
occurred among her seemingly incongruous group of volunteers, after a nurse wheeled 
out her patient — “a recumbent old lady waiting to die” — onto the roof of the 
hospital.
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 Burr, along with the nurse, patient and a young male observer, suddenly heard 
an airplane. As she explains: 
None of us could find it. I couldn't, of course! The nurse couldn't. . . . 
Even the small boy couldn't. Suddenly we heard a faint cry from the 
mummy form of the old lady wheeled into the sunshine. One partially 
transparent finger pointed to the southeast. And on the waxen face was the 
same expression I had seen on the boy's—the triumph of the hunter who 
first sights his quarry—for she who was about to die had spotted her 
plane.
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The GOC frequently united and even reunited citizens in spontaneous and often 
serendipitous ways like those described by Burr, as citizens labored together for a 
common defense cause. In Great Neck, New York two men who had fought “side by 
side” in France as part of the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I 
separated after the war and eventually reunited at the Great Neck Ground Observer Post 
years later.
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 Similarly, two men in Pasadena, California who worked together on the 
Panama Canal reunited after 19 years when the Air Force assigned them to the Pasadena 
filter center.
298
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The unique, communal nature of the GOC becomes apparent when compared with 
similar civic and civil defense organizations of the period such as the Civil Air Patrol. As 
with the GOC, national security personnel recognized the need for a national defense 
organization in the tense atmosphere of 1941 and, with the support of a board of military 
officers, Director of Civil Defense Fiorello H. LaGuardia signed an order establishing 
CAP one week prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
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 Like the GOC, CAP functioned as 
an unpaid, volunteer organization operating for the protection of American citizens under 
direction of the United States Air Force. Whereas the GOC focused on emergency 
prevention, the CAP responded to emergencies by dropping supplies and medicine, 
airlifting victims, and establishing communication centers in areas devastated by natural 
disasters.
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 As with the GOC, Civil Air Patrol members worked with the FCDA to meet 
civil defense objectives and often flew over GOC posts to provide volunteers with 
observation practice.
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Both organizations existed to bolster national security in the early Cold War 
period, but each developed slightly different objectives. The GOC sought to strengthen 
aerial defense with an observation network that would alert the USAF to suspected aerial 
threats, enabling the Air Defense Direction Center to meet these threats by dispatching 
interceptor pilots. The GOC mission omitted reference to citizenship or community 
service, focusing solely on strengthening air defense by supplementing radar through 
observation. The CAP mission, on the other hand, involved facilitating civil defense, 
creating a future pool of pilots for the USAF by educating teenage cadets about aviation, 
and explicitly teaching participants about serving their communities through missions 
like those involving search and rescue.
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The “Objects and Purposes” section of the CAP 1950 Annual Report to Congress 
reports that the CAP strove to “encourage and develop by example the voluntary 
contribution of private citizens to the public welfare.”303 Although USAF planners did 
not include this goal in the official mission of the GOC, nor does it appear in USAF 
records, the Aircraft Flash frequently noted the relationship between volunteer 
observation and healthy communities. Measuring the degree to which citizens themselves 
considered the GOC an asset to communities is difficult. The Aircraft Flash frequently 
represented participants’ perspectives, as GOC members sent in articles and photographs 
published by the magazine, and the USAF utilized individual publications of filter centers 
and observation post items in the “Flashes” section of the publication.304 Seattle’s filter 
center’s publication, Air Tracks, described how, through the GOC, participants could 
contribute to the health of American communities:  
It seems to me that there's something vital and healthy about this country 
when citizens — thousands of them just in western Washington — join 
forces with the military to protect this country. For, actually, in this 
business, warning is the first element of protection. But the magnificent 
thing about this operation is that these civilian ground observers are not 
protecting themselves in their own communities. . . . These people are 
protecting their neighbors. A baby in St. Louis may live because a ground 
observer in Randle sends in an Aircraft Flash report.
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The statement suggests that the sacrifices required of GOC volunteers unified not 
only communities but also the nation, reminiscent of historian Richard Fried’s description 
of atomic age patriots’ belief that participation in national security activities bolstered 
“flaccid citizenship.”306 
Both the GOC and CAP concentrated on the teenage demographic, claiming that 
organizational activities could reduce “juvenile delinquency.” In 1952, the CAP's Cadet 
Program trained as many as 48,276 boys and girls between the ages of 15 and 17 through 
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high school courses and summer encampments about aerial principles, life in the Air 
Force and the responsibility of U.S. citizens.
307
 Some CAP personnel hoped the program 
would give the “‘teen age groups a healthy and interesting outlet for inquisitive minds, in 
a period when juvenile delinquency is on the increase.’”308 Additionally, the CAP held an 
annual international cadet exchange to European countries, with the objective of 
simultaneously teaching youth about aviation and foreign cultures. CAP Chairman 
General Carl Spaatz, USAF, expressed a profound belief in the importance of teenagers 
to national security, asserting that “‘If young men all over the world could only get to 
know each other as you are doing, there would be no future wars.’”309 
While the GOC did not originally court the support of teenagers, The Aircraft 
Flash published several stories about the ability of the GOC to minimize teenage 
“delinquency” and provide boys with opportunities to prove they are “worthy citizens.”310 
Teenagers did not attend official courses like CAP members, and instead initiated their 
own projects and clubs related to the GOC. In Delaware and Oklahoma, teenagers 
organized TAGO, or Teen Ager Ground Observers, a self-governing organization in 
which teenagers between the ages of 14 and 19 attended meetings, elected officers, 
visited military installations, adopted constitutions, and assisted at filter centers.
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GOC teenagers in Grand Rapids, Michigan produced their own promotional film 
entitled “Operation Teenager,” with the goal of increasing program participation.312 The 
script they developed reflected the notion that the GOC provided opportunities for 
teenagers to be productive citizens, by declaring that they were “not spending, but using 
their free time voluntarily in the Ground Observer Corps, playing a vital role in the 
defense of our nation.”313 These projects, self-initiated rather than assigned, symbolized 
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the civic responsibility and self-sufficiency advocated by USAF and FCDA officials in 
the 1950s. 
In addition to affording teenagers an opportunity to convert their free time to 
productive purposes, The Aircraft Flash claimed that the GOC could improve family 
relations, much like the Powner family in the bomb shelter in Project Hideaway. The 
Aircraft Flash boasted that family teams operating at the Cheektowaga, New York post 
illustrated how the GOC provided “‘an excellent opportunity for parents of teenagers to 
become closer to their children while working on a project of mutual interest.’”314 Family 
and mother-daughter teams also participated in the CAP, but annual reports do not 
elaborate on their activities or achievements.
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Both the GOC and CAP encouraged the participation of families and teenagers, as 
well as that of women in a period in which many women considered their “central work” 
to be in the home.
316
 Elaine Tyler May asserts that women sought refuge from this 
domestic realm through “volunteer or community work” such as the GOC.317 Women 
comprised the majority of GOC volunteers and participated in the GOC at much higher 
rates than they did in the CAP, as 65% of GOC participants were female, compared with 
17.3% of CAP members.
318
 In World War II, women played a significant role in home 
front mobilization through various industrial jobs, inspiring them to search for new 
employment opportunities after the war.
319
 While many of these opportunities ceased 
with the war’s conclusion, women could continue to utilize these technical skills through 
the GOC. The program aligned with the daily routines of women more than CAP, as the 
Civil Air Patrol diverted women from their household responsibilities to activities 
requiring intensive training and physical demands. Female members of CAP served as 
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operations and administration officers, radio operators and pilots, and often found 
themselves in the air, far from the domestic realm.
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The CAP's Report to Congress for 1951 acknowledges that “women have just 
begun to find their niche in military aviation,” resulting in limited program 
participation.
321
 The organization restricted women from certain activities, permitting in 
1955 only “physically qualified” males to participate in the jet orientation course at 
Tyndall Air Force Base.
322
 Female GOC members like Jess Irwin, day director at the 
Boise filter center, on the other hand, participated in the GOC School (used for intensive 
GOC training) at Tyndall Air Force Base.
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In contrast to the Civil Air Patrol, the GOC accommodated the lifestyles of 
women in the early 1950s, which required that they perform a “wide range of 
occupational roles — early childhood educator, counselor, cook, nurse, housekeeper, 
manager, and chauffeur — all within the home.”324 The Aircraft Flash recognized the 
compatibility of these roles with the GOC, stating “Basically, of course, women are 
interested and involved in the home, and more concerned with its preservation . . . . This 
may explain why they have used their great influence in the home, the community and 
the nation to promote the Ground Observer Corps.”325 This statement speaks to 
McEnaney's concept that  
privatization brought civil defense to homes and neighborhoods, places 
where women supposedly presided full-time over the welfare of families 
and community members. Home protection made preparedness 
immediately a 'woman's concern,' for the skills and services required to 
prepare for and survive an attack were virtually the same as a housewife's 
domestic chores and community service.
326
 
 
The GOC could effectively utilize women for GOC activities because, as 
McEnaney argues, housewives spent the majority of their time in their homes and 
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neighborhoods, so the “average housewife could therefore, in their words, be 'on duty' 
twenty-four hours a day.”327 A playground constructed at the observation post in 
Mechanic Falls, Maine serves as an example of how the program facilitated domestic 
responsibilities of mothers, while allowing them to participate in activities outside of the 
home.
328
 Community initiative also served the Warwick, Virginia post, as the Parkview 
Women's Club watched the children of mothers who wanted to volunteer at the post.
329
 
Through the activities of female volunteers The Aircraft Flash tied ideological rhetoric to 
defense, asserting that women contributed to the creation of a program that “has more 
cohesion and stability than any which highly-regulated, dictator-governed nations have 
been able to develop.”330 
While both organizations employed the help of teenagers, celebrated community 
involvement and shared similar missions, the activities of the GOC encouraged and 
facilitated the participation of all citizens to a greater degree than the Civil Air Patrol. 
The GOC demanded shorter time commitments, lower participating costs, less 
physically-demanding activities and less extensive training and education than the CAP, 
thereby ensuring that more citizens could participate in Cold War defense. 
Financial requirements may also have barred participation in the CAP, as pilots 
flew their own aircraft on search missions and the USAF reimbursed them only for fuel 
and oil.
331
 According to the 1954 Annual Report, Congress did not subsidize the CAP, 
and the Air Force was constrained in the number of planes it could donate, making 
equipment difficult to procure for CAP missions.
332
 This meant that the Civil Air Patrol 
depended on membership dues from adult members, which, according to the Annual 
Report: Civil Air Patrol Auxiliary of the United States Air Force for 1952, “continued to 
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affect the adult membership” and “resulted in a gradual weeding-out of those members 
who lacked the spirit and aggressiveness.”333 In order to obtain equipment, members 
matched Air Force funds 10 to one, members owned 90% of planes, and they paid the 
personal expenses necessary for missions and conferences.
334
 Members absorbed 
additional financial burdens by accepting “the pay loss that occurs when CAP duty calls 
us away from our jobs.”335 
Volunteers in the GOC incurred nominal, if any, expenses, as business 
establishments within the community generally donated materials necessary to construct 
towers, or public sites made their buildings available as observation posts free of 
charge.
336
 The Air Force paid for telephone calls, training, and communications 
equipment, but required observers to construct posts.
337
 Observation required only 
binoculars, a clock and a log, minimizing the actual cost to volunteers.
338
 
The very nature of Civil Air Patrol activities restricted participation primarily to 
the able-bodied, while local Ground Observer Corps posts encouraged the involvement of 
those restricted by physical handicaps. CAP missions involved physically- and 
emotionally-demanding tasks, such as dropping supplies and restoring communication to 
flooded areas, evacuating “marooned pilots,” transporting victims from a massive fire 
described as “literally a holoca[u]st,” and in Maryland searching for the murderer of a 
seven-year-old child.
339
 GOC participants often alerted Air Force personnel to 
devastating fires and downed aircraft, but seldom intervened in these activities 
themselves.
340
  
CAP members frequently aided the handicapped through “mercy missions,” such 
as flying a polio victim from North Carolina to a New York hospital, but rarely received 
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help from the physically disabled.
341
 Ulysses L. Adams’ master’s thesis, A History of the 
Civil Air Patrol from 1941 to 1956, states that CAP cadets underwent a physical 
examination and that “good physical condition is desired,” but “physical disabilities will 
not necessarily preclude a youth from membership.”342 Thus, while the CAP accepted the 
disabled, they did not actively recruit them.  
Handicapped citizens could be equally as helpful as their able-bodied counterparts 
to the Ground Observer Corps, and the United States Air Force consistently recognized 
them for their efforts. Assistant chief observer John Heldmyer III, due to polio confined 
to a wheelchair since the age of 15, recruited, scheduled and verified information for the 
GOC in addition to running an insurance business and dry cleaning service.
343
 The Air 
Force recognized blind observer Kenneth Schickel of Miami, Florida by awarding him 
wings for using his seeing-eye dog to locate the type, distance and direction of suspicious 
planes.
344
 William Swayze maintained 24-hour operations at the Lapeer, Michigan post, 
despite the loss of his legs in an industrial accident, by regularly making telephone calls 
to observers. For Swayze's work, Brigadier General Lester J. Maitland, Michigan's civil 
defense director, presented him with a Freedoms Foundation's George Washington Honor 
Medal.
345
  
The Aircraft Flash argued that “people in this category [the handicapped] are so 
dedicated and give so much of themselves to the air defense of the nation is of utmost 
significance. For, by their very devotion to GOC duty, they reveal that they have shaken 
off the tendency to dwell on their own problems and are shouldering those that face all 
the people.”346 Observation activities accessible to citizens with “infirmities” allowed all 
citizens to demonstrate self-sufficiency and civic responsibility. 
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Because of the risk involved in CAP assignments, cadets and members underwent 
extensive training in various subjects, such as fire fighting, which may have hampered 
widespread participation and led to continued emphasis on younger, able-bodied 
cadets.
347
 Ground Observer Corps volunteers, on the other hand, ranged in age and often 
included the elderly, many of whom had served in previous wars, such as the 109-year-
old Confederate veteran who observed in Crestview, Florida.
348
 While the Civil Air 
Patrol required intensive training, the only training required for GOC volunteers involved 
studying the official Ground Observer Corps manual to identify threatening aircraft, and 
occasionally viewing a training film or working with mobile training teams for a few 
hours.
349
  
The GOC also varied from the CAP because assignments encouraged the 
participation of socially deviant groups, like prisoners, who in Plymouth, Michigan 
earned points for early release based on skywatching.
350
 The Aircraft Flash praised a 
Michigan prison camp system, composed of four camps entitled Michigan Corrections-
Conservation Camps, for “enabling the inmates to perform an important and honorable 
service for the society with which they once clashed.”351 The magazine similarly 
described how GOC activities allowed the New Mexico School for Boys, a correctional 
institution of the state, to “surely help the boys in their up-hill climb to restored self 
respect and good citizenship.”352 The use of existing structures, like those within prisons, 
enabled deviant groups to both bolster national security and prove they were “worthy 
citizens.” 
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The Aircraft Flash cited the Minnesota State Reformatory for Men, located in St. 
Cloud, Minnesota, as an example of how the GOC helped create self-sufficient and 
valuable citizens: 
Not only have the spotting duties been carried out thoroughly and without 
the slightest incident, but they have also been a strong rehabilatory factor. 
Of the 35 young men who have left the institution after serving as ground 
observers, only two have ever returned. This is 50 per cent better than the 
average for other parolees.
353
 
 
Whether or not prisoners felt an increased sense of self-respect or valued themselves as 
worthier citizens through GOC activities requires further research. 
CAP missions generally required significant planning and preparation and 
typically took place outside of the home (with the exception of CAP radio stations), 
whereas GOC volunteers could undertake observation activities virtually anywhere with 
minimal preparation, as evinced by Pamela Burr's account.
354
 Some volunteers like a 
Butte High School superintendent and school principal observed from their homes in 
Sentinel Butte, North Dakota.
355
 Others transformed their businesses into observation 
hubs, such as the H.J. Heinz Company in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, which 
established a post at the gate of its cannery and encouraged employees to volunteer 
throughout the day.
356
 In Lawrence, Michigan, Bruce McDaniels designated his filling 
station as the local observation post and often manned it, while Larry O'Connor of Cairo, 
Indiana designated the local grocery store attached to his house as the community's initial 
observation site.
357
  
Volunteers often discovered innovative ways to meet unique needs, like the 
Parkers, a couple from Lagoda, Indiana, who trained their collie puppy to listen for and 
alert them to approaching aircraft.
358
 Two teenage girls in Newark, Delaware rode ponies 
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a mile and a half from their home to their local observation post.
359
 Volunteer and U.S. 
forester Mackey B. Bryan invented a device to help new observers describe the location 
of an aircraft using a map, model airplane and buttons that lit up to represent the distance 
between the plane and post.
360
 These entrepreneurial and innovative endeavors, often 
predicated on private business, aligned with the FCDA's promotion of “self-preparedness 
and self-protection based on the traditional American values of individualism, privatism, 
and volunteerism.”361 In contrast to other civil defense programs, some GOC volunteers 
observed during work hours or incorporated GOC duties into recreational activities, 
adapting their lives to meet program needs. The disorganization of the GOC and lack of 
protocol ultimately encouraged personal innovation and adaption of the program at the 
local level that benefited communities. 
These GOC endeavors, representative of American “self-help” civil defense and 
predicated on private ownership and innovation, resulted in healthier communities. The 
value of the GOC extended beyond the USAF's original conceptualization of the program 
as a network to defend against nuclear attack. The program reinforced the welfare of 
local communities by assisting with natural disaster recovery and the prevention of 
crimes. GOC volunteers' involvement in reporting distressed and downed aircraft, 
spotting threatening weather patterns and alerting the Forest Service to fires made the 
organization essentially an auxiliary emergency group within communities. In fact, 
USAF Colonel Broun H. Mayall, Director of Civil Air Defense, “‘established the theory 
that support of the air defense mission through the GOC was identical with public 
service,” and that the GOC was a “legitimate phase of community enterprise, with a right 
to expect and receive its share of the community’s energies and resources.’”362  
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The unforeseen value of the GOC materialized during the implementation of the 
program at the local level. In Webster City, Iowa, county civil defense chairman Stewart 
Lund summoned GOC members to a one-block city fire and within ten minutes, 40 
volunteers had arrived at the scene.
363
 They reported on wind conditions and, under 
direction of the police, directed crowds and traffic to safety, thereby minimizing panic 
and preventing injuries. An observer in Elyria, Ohio witnessed two men break into a 
drive-in, alerted police and monitored the get-away car to help police locate the 
robbers.
364
 GOC volunteers at the New Mexico Boys School state correctional institution 
untiringly provided recovery assistance at a train collision in Springer, New Mexico, 
where they comforted and fed victims at 4 a.m., validating the theory that the GOC could 
reinforce good citizenship.
365
 In south Texas, volunteers observed an airplane smuggling 
across the Mexican Border and reported the incident to the U.S. Border Patrol.
366
 
In addition to enhancing community safety, the GOC reinforced a community's 
“spiritual unity” through activities related to the program.367 Volunteers interacted 
socially at towers and observation posts, as well as through promotional and recruitment 
activities. Life events took place at GOC filter centers and observation posts, such as 
marriage and death, including that of James E. Murphy, who was “fatally stricken” at an 
observation post in New York City.
368
  
Illustrating that civil defense could strengthen communities, GOC volunteers at 
the Spokane, Washington filter center, along with eight Air Force sergeants and two 
lieutenants, established a blood bank for teenage observer and hemophiliac George W. 
Priebe.
369
 According to The Aircraft Flash, the actions of Dallas filter center participants 
illustrated “that the GOC is a community asset wherever it is located.”370 When a fire 
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burned down Celeste High School in Texas and destroyed the library that provided 
primary “amusement and recreation” for the town of 729 people, Air Force Sergeant Viol 
Schumacher of the Dallas filter center initiated a drive to restore the library with a public 
information campaign using radio, television and newspapers that collected 3,000 
books.
371
 
Promotional and recruiting activities also stimulated community interaction. 
Door-to-door volunteer drives were popular in California, where volunteers and airmen 
canvassed for volunteers for hours in Vernalis, then attended a Sonora-Oakdale football 
game and dinner-dance following the drive.
372
 Using the support of volunteers, local 
businesses and Air Force personnel, the Canton, Ohio filter center held a fall rummage 
sale to raise money, bringing members of the community together.
373
 GOC participants 
held a barn dance at the “community meeting center” to raise money for the Scotts 
Valley, California observation post.
374
 
In addition to altruistic events at posts and filter centers, volunteers participated in 
social exchanges as a result of their involvement in the program. Forty volunteers at the 
Baltimore filter center and observation post spent a weekend together on the beach at 
Ocean City, Maryland.
375
 The Aircraft Flash commented that “concern for the defense of 
the nation against air attack brought these people into the GOC. Now GOC provides a 
common ground for meeting and doing socially. . . . We hope that others in the GOC 
might be similarly inspired by the example.”376 GOC volunteers across the nation 
participated in social events, like the GOC Bowling League of Burlington, Vermont.
377
  
Teenage observers considered observation towers social venues with the potential 
for romantic and sexual encounters, motivating Peter D. Baird to volunteer at the 
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observation post in Moscow, Idaho.
378
 Baird volunteered because he heard that the 
“fastest girl in the eighth grade” had signed up, “giving titillated Buffaloes [a Boy Scout 
troop] all manner of sexual double entendres to snicker about when discussing the 
observation shack.”379 Baird laments that “except for brief glimpses of her in a rakish 
Chevrolet driven by a high school boy with glistening black hair, we never saw the 
alluring eighth-grade girl anywhere that summer.”380 For others, like the oil executive 
described by Burr, author of “I am a Sky Sentry,” observation posts delivered this sexual 
promise, as Burr describes a “dizzy, blonde” patient, who came to the roof for fresh air. 
The patient inquired about the executive’s GOC duties and “observed that it would be 
cozier in that shack if he watched with a girl, and disappeared. Half an hour later she 
reappeared in a negligee and a cloud of perfume to offer her services to her country.”381 
The Aircraft Flash reported that social opportunities evolved into more profound 
commitments, frequently relaying stories about observers meeting and marrying as a 
result of GOC duties. Shirley Lash and Arnold Woolf met at the White Plains filter center 
in New York and eventually married on New Year’s Day, afterward reporting to three 
installations as a “husband-wife team,” while Wordna Brooks and W.R. Duke married at 
their local filter center in Shreveport, Louisiana.
382
 Through the GOC, volunteers 
experienced life events, ranging from getting married to passing away, and communities 
became temporarily safer and more united as citizens spent time together. 
The Ground Observer Corps affected communities differently depending on the 
composition of personnel participating. The first category of study includes areas 
consisting primarily of farmers, generally located in the Midwest. The second area of 
study includes major metropolitan centers, with concentrated populations that prospered 
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from tourism and entertainment, such as New York City and Miami. Finally, I examine 
areas with pre-existing observation posts, such as forest fire watchtowers and boats, 
primarily located along the northern border of the United States, and the Great Lakes 
area.  
In his 1957 paper “Civil Defense and Regions: An Exploratory Study,” Francis R. 
Allen asserts that enemies would be unlikely to attack agricultural areas with atomic 
weapons, although these areas might be susceptible to germ attack and “would probably 
be used from the defensive standpoint as relief and rehabilitation areas.”383 Jenny Barker-
Devine, writing in 2006, generally confirms Allen's contention and reiterates that “there 
was little need for rural residents to fear instant annihilation in the case of nuclear 
attack.”384 She argues that the FCDA solicited the participation of this region instead 
because “rural families also served as custodians of democracy and could prevent any 
type of socialism or communism from taking hold in local, state, and national 
governments.”385 
While the FCDA envisioned civil defense as an impediment to the spread of 
communism, many rural participants discovered that intensive GOC efforts afforded 
small towns a degree of notoriety. Oakes describes that in Operation Alert the 
participation of “thousands of small towns across the country that did not intend to be left 
out of an event that appealed to the passions of patriotism as well as the interests of civic 
pride and the competitiveness of community spirit.”386 
The GOC activities in Cairo, Indiana, a crossroads consisting of three homes, 
demonstrates this community pride. Larry O'Connor, World War II Navy veteran and 
owner of Cairo's only store, led the effort to establish a GOC observation post. Sources 
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are inconsistent as to why and how Cairo was selected as a site for a watchtower and why 
O’Connor organized the GOC volunteers. A Lafayette Journal & Courier article from 
July 11, 1976 reports that Governor Henry F. Schricker appointed O’Connor tower 
supervisor in 1950 and that the Air Force asked him to rally volunteers from the 
community.
387
 Cairo observer and tower co-architect Jim Haan stated in an interview 
with this author that the governor approached O’Connor to organize the post, but in a 
letter to the Lafayette Journal & Courier O’Connor claims that the “civilian head” of the 
GOC in Indianapolis commissioned him to organize the Cairo post.
388
 
The Cairo post initially operated out of O’Connor’s grocery store, and in 1950 
and 1951 observers worked only on weekends, volunteering around-the-clock between 
1951 and 1953.
389
 According to Haan, the post was necessary because of Cairo’s location 
along a line of beacon lights that could guide the enemy to industrial centers in 
Chicago.
390
 In 1952 building began on the tower and the local Rural Electric Membership 
Cooperative (REMC) donated and set the tower poles, while local merchants from 
Lafayette and the town of Battle Ground donated materials, and residents in surrounding 
areas furnished labor.
391
 Between 90 and 120 volunteers from surrounding areas 
volunteered at the Cairo tower.
392
 Haan states that volunteers worked in two-hour shifts 
and that he and other farmers worked all day in the fields, while female family members 
manned the towers, and the men volunteered throughout the night.
393
 
The Lafayette Journal and Courier, along with letters from participants, states 
that the tower was the first of its kind in several respects. The USAF commissioned the 
tower in 1952 and, according to O'Connor, it was “the first G.O. Post officially 
commissioned by the U.S.A.F. in the U.S.A.”394 Lafayette Journal & Courier article 
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“Skywatch Tower in Cairo Stark Reminder of History” claims that the tower was one of 
the first freestanding towers constructed over the ground.
395
 Commanding Officer of the 
South Bend GOC detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Forest R. Shafer, mentioned in a letter 
to John M. Harris, former Director of the Tippecanoe County Historical Association, “I 
can verify that the tower constructed at Cairo, Indiana was the first of its kind within my 
jurisdiction but cannot confirm that it was the first in the United States. However, I am 
certain it was among the very first, at least.”396 Associate Director of the Tippecanoe 
County Historical Association Paula Woods elaborated about the tower “firsts,” declaring 
that “‘It's really unique because this one was used for [as a] model for ones built all over 
the country. We had the prototype.’”397  
Regardless of whether these claims about tower “firsts” can be substantiated, 
participants' beliefs that the Cairo tower was the first of its kind in the nation created a 
sense of pride in their community, evident in the commissioning ceremony that attracted 
500 attendees to Cairo to observe flyovers of jets and speeches by public officials.
398
 At 
the ceremony, Lt. Governor John Watkins extolled residents for demonstrating “how 
rapidly the rural communities have moved forward” and that “the residents of a rural 
community have set an example for the nation.”399 In his letter to John M. Harris in 1976, 
Lt. Col. Shafer verified the uniqueness of this role, writing “I do remember that this tower 
received much acclaim at that time due to a superior effort by such a small group of 
patriotic citizens.”400 Haan illustrated in his interview with this author that the recognition 
of USAF personnel and public officials instilled in residents a sense of pride in their 
contributions, stating “We had some representatives down here and felt pretty good about 
it.”401 He contends that the GOC tower made “a pretty important place out of it [Cairo]. 
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There was a lot of business up there, a lot of people coming and going and working on 
the tower. And there was for days and days and days a lot of people up there.”402  
The experience of Cairo volunteers continued to impact them, as they rallied for 
decades to commemorate the tower under the direction of Larry O’Connor. Residents 
held a dedication ceremony for the tower, attended by members of the state legislature 
“in the “Bicentennial Year – 1976.”403 In 1976, O’Connor also submitted a nomination of 
the tower to the National Register of Historic Places, which was eventually listed on the 
Register in 2003.
404
 In 1978, O’Connor appealed to the Tippecanoe County Park Board to 
establish a memorial and park near the tower, to be maintained by the Pleasant Grove 
Grange Lodge.
405
 In 1980, O’Connor with other Cairo residents received the limestone 
monument they had ordered to commemorate the volunteers with a sculpted image of a 
man, woman and child peering into the skies.
406
 While not all of these commemorative 
efforts were successful, they illustrate the importance of the tower to local residents. 
The structure and operations of the Cairo post were similar to most midwestern 
and rural posts, where, with some exceptions, a local citizen and his family typically 
volunteered his home or small business as the community observation center. Similar to 
the Cairo post, the Skie family of Lennox, South Dakota operated a post from their farm's 
silo and kept the post in operation for 24-hours each day using a small group of 
community volunteers.
407
 For five years, Post Supervisor in Walnut, Illinois, Elton 
Conley, operated the local post from his farm, which eventually moved to a separate 
building like O’Connor’s Cairo post.408 In this rural sector, typically a patriotic local 
resident rallied the community to construct a post or volunteered, as did Francis Wright, 
Supervisor of the Whitewater post in Indiana, who “recruited practically all of 
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Whitewater's 125 residents into GOC duty.”409 The USAF specifically targeted farmers 
for participation in the GOC, appealing to their inherent work ethic.  
According to Allen, author of “Civil Defense and Regions,” coastal and urban 
areas differed from those in the Midwest because “urban-industrial, high-income-level 
parts of the nation,” such as New York, “would undoubtedly stand a greater chance of 
being bombed in event of war.”410 While the need for GOC volunteers was greatest in 
metropolitan areas because of the likelihood of attack, USAF officials often found 
recruitment in these regions very challenging due to their highly concentrated 
populations. Officials lamented that in urban areas “where next-door neighbors can 
remain total strangers for years, it is very difficult to acquaint even a small segment of the 
population with necessity for GOC.”411 
The Aircraft Flash contends that observation in these areas “would not be 
operational without the able assistance of business and industry” and praised the “active 
cooperation” of Sears, Roebuck and Co. in Philadelphia, which provided a film projector 
to watch movies, parkas for observers and donated the use of its clock tower for 
improved observation.
412
 All employees of the Protection Department at an ALCOA 
plant in Massena, New York participated in observation. Charles DeLong of the 
department stated “‘Not only does the plant-sponsored activity aid in a vital defense 
program, it also substantially raises the morale of the entire Department.’”413 The 
Edgewater Beach Hotel in Chicago provided an example of the commingling of defense 
and social opportunities when it provided GOC participants with an observation post and 
a place for “social get-togethers” and banquets “highlighted by professional-type 
entertainment obtained by members of the post.”414 
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The majority of volunteers in these regions observed from posts located on 
existing commercial structures, such as a brewery malt tower in Newark, New Jersey and 
Las Vegas's Hotel Fremont, the “swankiest address in the fabulous city of sun, sand and 
silver.”415 The Aircraft Flash also noted the importance of community in urban areas, 
describing at Hotel Fremont “unprecedented cooperation between the GOC and private 
business to achieve the highest type of community support for the air defense of the 
nation.”416 The voluntary participation of private industry in GOC operations exemplified 
the “American-style” civil defense and contrasted that of the Soviet Union. 
Advisory councils typically served large cities, where USAF located most filter 
centers requiring hundreds of volunteers. These councils, described as an “organized 
group of representatives of . . . community organizations,” coordinated the needs of Air 
Force personnel and the community.
417
 Because the Air Force could not know the unique 
needs of each city and because local government ultimately carried out GOC activities, a 
moderating body was necessary. Specifically, the councils provided guidance for filter 
centers, promoted the Ground Observer Corps and assisted with recruiting campaigns. 
These councils were comprised of representatives of community organizations, such as 
the Rotary Club and the American Federation of Labor, who worked together to identify 
unique community needs and helped mobilize support for the Ground Observer Corps 
based on these specific needs.
418
 The councils represented a belief in the value of the 
individual to the group, as The Aircraft Flash contended that these councils did “much to 
impart a sense of participation to the ordinary citizen,” but also that “the very 
preservation of our democratic way of life points up the importance of groups in forming 
opinions”419 
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Recruiting for the GOC in urban regions stimulated community interaction, but 
typically word-of-mouth and intimate meetings led to recruitment in rural regions, 
whereas metropolitan areas hosted extravagant entertainment events. At the Miami filter 
center male volunteers dressed in drag entertained 900 at a fried chicken picnic.
420
 
Publicity and entertainment techniques flourished in California because, according to The 
Aircraft Flash, it was the “land of parades, beauty contests and publicity schemes of all 
sorts” and “one of the 'promotinest' GOC units in one of the 'promotinest' states of the 
Union.”421 Beauty shows and parades achieved exceptional results in urban areas because 
“the theory behind such activity would seem to be that if beauty can be related to an idea, 
event or thing, that idea, event or thing, itself, will become attractive.”422 
The third major GOC sector I analyze comprises observation posts in the Great 
Lakes area, Alaska, and the states along the Canadian border. The USAF considered 
these posts, particularly those in Alaska, important because of their proximity to the 
Soviet threat. As with metropolitan areas, posts along the northwestern border relied on 
the participation of private businesses like Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. (MANDO). 
These border posts incorporated skywatching into existing structures and activities, such 
as forest fire towers and boats. Navy reservists and naval ships carrying radar extended 
detection coverage along the northern border, lengthening the DEW line.
423
  
Few observation posts along the northern border had access to electricity and 
therefore experienced communication problems. Ground Observer Corps members 
developed innovative methods to relay aircraft reports. The Ground Observer Corps in 
Arden, Washington, a village of 50 citizens, most of whom watched from their houses, 
first employed a “primitive” signaling system “with the observer either pounding on a 
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cross-cut saw or ringing a cowbell when they sighted a plane. Later, an electrical buzzer 
system was installed.”424 Crews struggled with transmitting observation reports and 
eventually sent them to shore stations that re-transmitted the ships' calls to filter 
centers.
425
 
Observers from 1300 existing towers, used to search for forest fires, assisted the 
GOC with skywatching, and according to The Aircraft Flash these activities broke up the 
monotony of forestry-related observation.
426
 The USAF credits the U.S. Forestry Service 
for soliciting considerable participation in northern areas, such as Spokane, 
Washington.
427
 The Aircraft Flash extolled the aid of private industrial firms, citing the 
MANDO as “a sterling example of industrial cooperation” for encouraging their 
American and Canadian employees to participate in the GOC.
428
 
American and Canadian shipping crews in freighters, ferries and fishing boats 
began aiding the GOC in 1954.
429
 The Air Force noted that natural obstacles to 
observation posed by the 95,000 square miles making up the Great Lakes “have been 
bridged through determination — sometimes ingenuity — that results from cooperation 
and teamwork among citizens when they realize their country's in need.”430 This assertion 
aligns with the USAF and FCDA's concept that voluntary collaborations could overcome 
security obstacles and even natural impediments. This teamwork included collaborations 
between the United States Air Force and the Canadian Air Defence Command working 
together to defend their territories against a common defense threat.
431
 
The Aircraft Flash published several articles showcasing GOC volunteers in 
Alaska, emphasizing that they participated heavily in the program, despite 
communication problems and frigid weather.
432
 The Air Force recognized that Alaska 
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would be the first line of defense in detecting the atomic air threat and when Alaskan 
observers detected contrails over Nunivak Island in 1952 the Air Force intensified 
observation efforts and reconfirmed the value of the GOC.
433
 Alaskan fishermen, 
trappers, teachers, Eskimos and missionaries volunteered with the GOC, and in the 
village of Nulato all 230 residents volunteered, reporting to the Jesuit missionary 
Reverend S.J. Baud.
434
 Here, too, the program strengthened traditional values, as boys of 
St. Mary's Mission of Andreafski, Alaska fished and caught “up on aircraft recognition” 
in an “effort at self-improvement,” resulting in one of the most efficient and united 
observation posts in the community
435
 
The rhetoric used to describe the Ground Observer Corps conveys the FCDA’s 
and USAF’s beliefs that the way Americans participated in the GOC, and civil defense in 
general, was as important to air defense as the ability to detect and retaliate against an 
atomic attack. The implementation of this “American-style civil defense” brought 
observers together socially, encouraged families to cooperate, afforded women 
opportunities to serve outside of the home and generally strengthened the welfare of 
communities through supplementary observation activities. While Air Force officials 
never achieved desired participation numbers, the citizens who did participate 
demonstrated innovative and entrepreneurial skills like creative fundraising activities and 
novel observation tools, representative of Cold War ideology. Ultimately GOC volunteers 
demonstrated that those “who stand and watch also serve.” 
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Conclusion 
The GOC is now long forgotten, as demonstrated by the Cairo tower, once so 
revered by the community for decades through ceremonies and a historical marker, but 
now in decay. As with many civil defense programs of the 1950s the GOC has been 
deemed a quirky, superfluous program, constructed by an overly-paranoid people. 
However, the GOC established a model of national defense that solicited the participation 
of the general public. Amanda J. Dory’s “American Civil Security: The U.S. Public and 
Homeland Security” explains how the strategy behind 1950s defense programs still sheds 
light on modern civil defense.
436
 Dory asserts that “a historical precedent for educating 
and involving the U.S. public directly in homeland defense efforts can be found in civil 
defense measures taken during the Cold War.”437 A comparison of GOC Advisory 
Councils and the Citizens Corps, a twenty-first century program described by Dory that 
was developed to encourage local volunteers to prepare and respond to community 
disasters, reveals similarities that imposed organization on local residents, rather than on 
national defense officials.
438
 Dory’s work supports McEnaney’s assertion that the FCDA 
“was the only postwar national security agency to solicit mass citizen participation in its 
planning and implementation.”439 
Dory touches on the differences between atomic age and twenty-first century civil 
defense programs, stating that the post-9/11 United States has failed to develop a 
“comprehensive and updated effort comparable to that employed by the United States in 
the face of the Soviet threat.”440 This Cold War civil defense, Dory argues, succeeded by 
linking patriotism to “a larger sense of community and civic duty,” similar to my 
argument in Chapter Three that local assumption of GOC activities endeared the program 
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to the volunteers and gave them a sense of pride.
441
 This community initiative differs 
from post-9/11 defense, as Dory quotes Tom Ridge, former Secretary of Homeland 
Security, who implored Homeland Security to “‘empower citizens to play a more direct 
role’” in their own defense.442  
Dory’s comparison of 2000s defense and that of the 1950s reveals the GOC to be 
unique in mobilizing a vast and diverse segment of the population to participate in their 
own defense. Study of scholarship regarding domestic anticommunism, life and politics 
after the bomb, and atomic age civil defense illuminates some of the political and social 
factors that motivated civilians to steel themselves against the Cold War atomic threat.  
In my examination of historical scholarship regarding the response to communism 
in the U.S., I discovered that due to temporal distance scholars in the 1970s dedicated 
more research to victims’ experiences and increasingly criticized their persecutors. After 
the Cold War, and with access to new Soviet sources, historians provided more nuanced 
accounts of domestic communism, studying not only Senator Joseph McCarthy, but also 
the actions of the American Communist Party that made members susceptible to 
persecution. Post-9/11 examination of early Cold War domestic communism generally 
criticizes the persecutors for establishing political witch-hunting in response to national 
security crises. A combined fear of domestic communism and Soviet use of the atomic 
bomb energized some citizens to meet these threats through the Ground Observer Corps. 
An examination of life and politics in the early atomic era reveals how political 
messages and individual fears caused citizens to retreat to the home and generally adhere 
to traditional gender roles. However, through the GOC women could both attend to 
domestic duties and utilize their technical skills, as this emphasis on the home facilitated 
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observation activities. Scholarship reveals that the actions and opinions of the general 
public, policy-makers, social commentators and political figures influenced one another. 
This resulted in the consensus that traditional gender roles could generate a feeling of 
security, as many citizens and political figures assumed that homosexuals and the 
sexually deviant were naturally sympathetic to the communist cause. Additionally, the 
majority of studies about the early atomic age conclude that the atomic bomb 
fundamentally altered American life and politics, but researchers continue to dispute the 
duration and intensity of the bomb’s impact.  
Scholars of civil defense merged cultural and political studies and favored the 
interpretation of the militarization of the home front as the result of civil defense. More 
recent scholarship explores dissent against civil defense. Much of this scholarship 
explains the ideology, aptly described by McEnaney and Oakes, behind civil defense that 
resulted in the privatization of the GOC. While civil defense scholarship rarely analyzes 
the Ground Observer Corps, many of the contentions made by these scholars are 
applicable to the program. This applicability is especially true of agricultural historian 
Jenny Barker-Devine, who focuses on how the FCDA hoped to convince rural and 
farming communities that they could reinforce the moral backbone of the nation in the 
early Cold War through civil defense and agricultural activities.  
Most scholars conclude that the advent of atomic weapons upset citizens’ 
understanding of personal safety, but these citizens sought security primarily through the 
domestic realm — that provided a sense of security through familial relationships — 
rather than civil defense. Even then, the success of civil defense programs like the GOC 
depended on the routines and parameters of one’s household and neighborhood. 
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Despite generalized apathy, limited radar coverage in the early Cold War period 
necessitated a program geared towards the detection of air threats. This faulty radar and a 
nominal defense budget resulted in the Air Force’s establishment of the GOC, considered 
by USAF planners as an inefficient but inexpensive method. In my examination of the 
program’s organization and Air Force objectives I have demonstrated that at the GOC’s 
inception in 1949 until approximately 1953 Air Force officials hoped that the GOC could 
bolster air defense through enhanced detection. After the Korean War and until the 
termination of the program in 1959, I have shown that the Air Force realized that the 
program could not effectively strengthen air defense and officials instead harnessed the 
GOC to gain support for the principles of preparation and volunteerism. 
After much disagreement about the size of a civil defense program and who 
would organize it, members of Congress passed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 
that left organization up to individuals, rather than federal officials, and promoted 
individualism, volunteerism and self-initiation.
443
 This democratic ideology encouraged 
participants to take ownership of the program. GOC volunteers adapted the program to 
suit local needs by inventing new detection methods, like using a cross-cut saw to alert 
observers to a threat, and creating makeshift posts.  
The program’s structure, with duties split between the USAF and local defense 
agencies, hindered effectiveness and confused both local defense directors and 
volunteers. Analysis of the establishment of the GOC in the State of Indiana confirms the 
difficulties in organizing and recruiting a bifurcated and, at times, largely unsupervised 
program. Correspondence from Governor Adlai Stevenson to Governor Henry F. 
Schricker speaks to this confounding organization as Governor Stevenson admits his 
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confusion about how to proceed with its development.
444
 Obstacles such as these 
demonstrate the challenge inherent in mobilizing an entire nation against such a vague 
threat.  
Poor program organization and privatized civil defense encouraged citizens to 
adapt the GOC to their community’s needs, which would have been improbable with a 
rigid command structure. Because county defense officials often neglected overseeing 
program operations, participants at many posts redefined their purpose to include weather 
spotting, charitable and social activities. These activities included a blood drive for a sick 
observer, a wedding at a filter center, a GOC bowling league and tornado watching.  
Study of the Ground Observer Corps illuminates Cold War defense struggles, the 
historical context surrounding the Cold War and the effect two major world wars had on 
the national psyche. Contemporary study of the GOC and the context in which it operated 
is particularly timely, given the continuing threat of atomic weapons and the emergence 
of new security threats, like terrorism, in the twenty-first century. Study of the GOC 
demonstrates how a national security threat mobilized citizens and affected local 
communities.  
Despite examination of the involvement of volunteers, the Ad Council, FCDA 
leaders, USAF personnel, state and local elected and appointed officials, much about the 
program and the era remains to be researched and analyzed. Women’s historians could 
examine how the GOC provided opportunities for women to work outside of the home in 
an era when citizens sought security within it. The Aircraft Flash noted women’s 
contributions, but few women’s accounts exist, despite the fact that they comprised the 
majority of volunteers. Additionally, military and national security historians will 
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discover that study of the GOC enriches the history of national defense and debates about 
standing armies, universal military training, and the military industrial complex. Other 
studies should include the history of volunteerism and civilian participation in civil 
defense, perhaps in comparison to that of the twenty-first century. Additional 
participants’ accounts should be located or recorded and historians ought to inquire about 
how participants viewed the program both in retrospect and in comparison to modern 
security threats. Researchers should also ask volunteers if they felt they made a 
perceptible impact on their communities and whether they continued to meet socially 
after the termination of the program.  
It is easy to belittle such a rudimentary system of defense and ridicule the notion 
that civilian volunteers, without direct supervision or coordinated operations, could 
safeguard the nation from the weapon that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, 
given the conservative defense budget and limited radar efficiency of the 1950s, this 
program served as the best form of protection against the atomic threat. The GOC 
represents the United States’ first attempt to come to terms with the atomic bomb and the 
ongoing struggle to mend the “fence full of holes.”  
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